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ESSENTIALIZATION OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND LINKS TO MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
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Major Professor: Peter R. Blake, Assistant Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences 
 
ABSTRACT 
Kantian theories of morality focus on the universal application of moral rules. 
However, both children and adults often apply different moral standards to in-group and 
out-group members. Psychologists have proposed that this group bias in moral judgments 
may be explained by “social essentialism”, a tendency to conceive of social groups as 
natural kinds. This dissertation uses a cross-cultural, developmental approach to test this 
hypothesis by investigating a) how the essentialization of five social groups changes with 
age and b) whether the differences in essentialization explain children’s moral judgments 
in inter-group contexts. 
In Study 1, I tested the degree of essentialization of five social categories 
(Gender, Nationality, Religion, Socioeconomic Status (SES), and Teams) in 5-10 year 
olds (N=147) and adults (N=223) in Turkey and the U.S. I hypothesized three possible 
patterns of results indicating different mechanisms underlying essentialization: 1) 
essentialization is a strong basic bias invariant across ages, cultures and categories; 2) 
essentialization varies by category across culture based on historical group conflicts; and 
3) essentialization is over-generalized for pseudo-biological categories (Gender, 
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Nationality) and declines with age for other categories in both cultures. I found strong 
support for the third mechanism and striking similarities in the developmental patterns by 
category across cultures. 
Study 2 examined the hypothesized link between children’s social essentialist bias 
and moral judgments in the US (N=211). I predicted that for highly essentialized 
categories from Study 1 (i.e., Gender), children would believe that it is more acceptable 
to harm the out-group than the in-group. There were no systematic differences between 
in-group and out-group judgments and no relationship with essentialization, however. 
These null results suggest that children are more Kantian than recent work on social 
groups proposes. Essentialism did, however, affect moral reasoning in inter-group 
contexts in more indirect ways, when accompanied by other social phenomena, such as 
salient discrimination.  
Combined, these studies make two contributions to the field. First, essentialist 
beliefs in the social domain are triggered cross-culturally by a biological representation of 
some categories. Second, children are not generally sensitive to group membership in 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 Universal principles of morality demand an absolute moral standing and respect 
for all humans. Accordingly, classical theories of morality – grouped under the umbrella 
term “Kantian theories” – focus on the application of moral rules to everyone, regardless 
of group membership. However, experimental work has shown that young children do 
not always behave in accordance to this principle. Specifically, by 4 years of age, 
children believe that moral transgressions are more serious in an interaction between 
members of the same group compared to those between members of different groups 
(Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). As children become members of different social groups, they 
also begin to favor and prefer in-group members when engaging in moral and social 
reasoning (Rhodes, 2014; Diesendruck & Weiss, 2015). This bias in early childhood may 
provide a foundation for adults’ beliefs concerning in-group loyalty and the acceptability 
of harm towards out-group members (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006).  
What psychological processes underlie this tendency to view moral transgressions 
as more acceptable toward out-group members? One major theoretical position identifies 
“essentialist” thinking about social categories as the primary mechanism. “Essentialism”, 
in social cognition, refers to the tendency to conceive of social categories as discrete, 
natural-kind-like categories, cognitively represented as coherent units based on common 
intrinsic features (Hirschfeld, 1998). In adults, the role of intergroup cognitive bias in 
moral reasoning has been linked to the tendency for “essentialist” thinking about social  
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categories (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Gil-
White, 2001). Children also display an “essentialist” bias in their everyday thinking, 
including reasoning about biology and the social world (Gelman, 2003). However, 
children’s essentialist thinking about social groups has not been explored in relation to 
the development of moral reasoning until very recently (see Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, 
Dunham, & Cimpian, 2017). A systematic, developmental approach in studying the 
possible role of social essentialist reasoning in psychological processes underlying 
intergroup morality allows us to identify not just when these processes emerge, but also 
offers insight into the mechanisms that underlie changes with age. Furthermore, given 
research showing cultural variation in both moral judgments (Shweder, Mahapatra, & 
Miller, 1987; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Barrett et al., 2016) and social essentialism 
(Diesendruck et al., 2013; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006), and recent critiques of WEIRD 
samples in psychology (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010), it is important to contrast 
results from the U.S. with at least one non-WEIRD sample.   
 To this aim, this dissertation projects presents a comprehensive investigation on 
the relationship between early essentialist thinking, cultural input and moral 
development. In Chapter 2, three studies will be presented on the development of social 
essentialist beliefs among children in a non-Western culture, Turkey, (Study 1), and the 
U.S. (Study 2) and adults from both countries (Study 3). In these studies, using an 
experimental approach, we have 1) measured the degree to which five different social 
categories are essentialized by children and adults, 2) examined the degree of 
differentiation among children and adults’ essentialist beliefs about the five social 
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categories of interest, and 3) explored different dimensions of essentialist thinking and 
their role in essentialist beliefs about the relevant social categories. We discuss the results 
of these studies in terms of different theories of social essentialism. In Chapter 3, we then 
replicate the U.S. results from Chapter 2 using a different design and present findings on 
a possible link between social essentialism and moral judgment in inter-group contexts 
among children (Study 4). We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of 
moral development. Finally, in Chapter 4, we summarized our findings and present 
concluding remarks about the relation between social essentialism and moral reasoning.  
What is Essentialism? 
The question of what makes something what it is has interested philosophers and 
scientists over the course of history. In the Republic, Plato conjectured an entire realm 
containing the real “essences” of every token object, concept, or biological entity 
observed in the world (Plato & Lee, 1974). Plato’s theory of “essence” is the core of 
Platonic idealism, the idea that there are two realities: the “essential” one and the 
“perceived” one. Accordingly, things are perceived as one thing or another in virtue of 
their essences, which Plato defined as ideal, eternal, unalterable, and permanent forms. 
Later, Aristotle refined Platonic idealism by defining “essence” as that which all 
members of a category have in common, and without which something cannot be a 
member of a given category (Cohen, 2015). Both Plato and Aristotle’s accounts of what 
makes something what it is are “essentialist” theories, appealing to pre-defined qualities 
that compromise an essence.  
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Already in these early examples of essentialism, an important distinction to draw 
is that between reality and the perception of reality. While classical philosophers were 
interested in the structure and form of reality, cognitive psychologists have focused on 
understanding and explaining how the mind perceives and represents reality. Although 
the idea of essentialism in cognitive psychology has its roots in the classical 
philosophical accounts, the definition of essence in psychology has more to do with 
causality, a perceived quality or force that causes the observable properties of members 
in a category. Causal essence is what establishes the identity of objects to a perceiver.  
Despite the discussion about “essences” in traditional, Western philosophy, the 
idea that categories share a common essence is not supported by contemporary science 
(Leslie, 2013; Shtulman & Shultz, 2008). For example, animal species change over 
evolutionary time-scales as opposed to being fixed categories for millions of years; 
essentialist reasoning, thus, cannot account for the scientific species concept (Gelman & 
Rhodes, 2012). Therefore, psychologists define essentialist thinking as a conceptual bias 
that is pervasive and arguably universal. To be more precise, psychological essentialism 
is defined as a pervasive bias to cognitively represent categories as reflecting something 
informative, stable, and meaningful about their members, as predicting individual 
qualities and development of their members independent of other factors, and 
importantly, as marking fundamental similarities between members and differences 
between kinds (Gelman, 2004).    
Extensive research in developmental psychology has documented that children 
are essentialist thinkers with respect to some categories, like natural kinds (e.g., water, 
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gold) and biological entities (e.g., cats, butterflies) (for a review of the literature, see 
Gelman, 2003), but also with respect to social categories (e.g., race; see Hirschfeld, 
1998). For example, children as young as 3 years of age believe that race is an intrinsic, 
immutable, and essential aspect of a person’s identity. We next review the evidence for 
the development of children’s essentialist thinking about natural and biological kinds and 
social categories. 
Essentializing Natural and Biological Kinds 
Research from developmental psychology suggests that starting at a very young 
age, children have a set of intuitive beliefs about natural kinds (e.g., plant species like the 
oak tree, animal species like dogs or cats, and natural substances like water), as well as 
social categories (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, etc.) that may serve as cognitive pre-
requisites for an essentialist bias (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). For example, as young as 
4 years of age, children understand the appearance-reality distinction (Flavell, Flavell, & 
Green, 1983; Harris, Donnelly, Guz, & Pitt-Watson, 1986; Woolley & Wellman, 1993); 
are able to represent identity as a persistent and immutable set of characteristics 
(Kohlberg, 1966; Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996); expect and search for regularities in 
intentional action, as well as in physical causality (even in infancy) (Bullock, Gelman, & 
Baillargeon, 1982; Powell & Spelke, 2013; Ma & Xu, 2013; Baillargeon, 2002); and 
show a tendency to attribute causal power to unobservable entities like mental states, 
germs, or God (Wellman, 1990; Kalish, 1996; Woolley & Phelps, 2001).  
In addition to these more general cognitive capacities, children possess two 
specific concepts that are more directly tied to an essentialist bias: identity maintenance 
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and innate potential. Identity maintenance refers to the belief that animals, but not 
artifacts, maintain their identity over transformations (Keil, 1989). Children as young as 4 
and 5-years attribute this persistence in the identity of animals to something “inside” the 
animal (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). Other studies also suggest that young children rely 
on a conception of internal, essential attributes in reasoning about what makes an animal 
the kind of animal it is even after physical transformations (Diesendruck, Gelman, & 
Lebowitz, 1998), and in thinking about the process of natural growth (Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991). Thus, the belief in identity maintenance seems to 
be a core component of children’s essentialist thinking about natural kind categories.  
Innate potential refers to the idea that biological kinds have an innate 
predisposition to grow into a particular form in spite of potentially countervailing 
environmental factors. For example, children believe that a baby Kangaroo would show 
Kangaroo-like characteristics, like having a pouch and hopping, even if raised among 
goats (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). In other studies, children were asked whether an 
infant born white and raised by a black family (and vice-versa) would grow to be like the 
birth parents or the adoptive parents (Hirschfeld, 1995, 1998). By 4 years of age, children 
reasoned that the infant would grow to be like the birth parents, suggesting that even in 
the social domain, children tend to reason in terms of a category-specific, innate potential 
that is present at birth and actualized over the course of development. Thus, around 4 and 
5 years of age, children already believe that members of certain categories have a 




Essentializing Social Categories 
Studies of children’s attitudes towards some social categories, including race, 
ethnicity, and gender suggest that the early essentialist bias is not limited to natural and 
biological kinds, but extends to reasoning about social categories. For example, earlier 
research found that children in the U.S. believe that race, ethnicity, and gender are fixed 
at birth and unchanging over the course of development, an idea that resonates with the 
belief in identity maintenance (Hirschfeld, 1998). These findings have led some 
researchers to suggest that children and adults cognitively represent human social 
categories as “natural” or “pseudo-biological” categories (Gil-White, 2001; Rothbart & 
Taylor, 1992). However, while there is general agreement that children essentialize social 
categories, there are conflicting theoretical accounts of how this process occurs. 
Two Models of Social Category Essentialization 
 Some psychologists and anthropologists attribute the pattern of essentialist 
thinking in children (and adults) to a domain-specific cognitive mechanism for 
conceptualizing folkbiology, and in some instances, tacitly equate essentialism with the 
belief in biological determinism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Martin & Parker, 1995). If 
this is the case, then essentialist reasoning should only apply to biological or pseudo-
biological entities. However, both children and adults appear to apply essentialist 
reasoning to non-biological categories (see Hirschfeld, 1998, and Diesendruck, Goldfein-
Elbaz, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 2013). This has led other researchers to argue that 
there is no specific domain for essentialism, and that essentialist thinking is a mode of 
construal (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). On this view, essentialism is a domain-general 
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assumption invoked differently in different domains based on the causal structure of the 
domain. In fact, some researchers argue that essentialist thinking, although a cognitive 
bias, is triggered by anomalies and inconsistencies in the world (e.g. gender 
discrimination in the workplace, the imbalanced mapping of power to race, or simply 
differences in appearance, language, accent, skin color, or even mere labels) as a way to 
explain these inconsistencies, and plays an important role in furthering political and 
economic inequalities (see Guillaumin, 1980, on racial essentialism, and Fuss, 1989, on 
gender essentialism). 
As a concrete example of the role of causal anomalies in essentialist thinking, 
Diesendruck et al., (2013) show that the specific categories essentialized by children in 
Israel and the U.S. are influenced by political and social conflict. Thus, children in Israel, 
for example, viewed ethnicity (Arab vs. Jew) as an essential factor for social 
categorization, and there is an increase with age in essentialist thinking with respect to 
ethnicity. Presumably, the anomaly that requires an explanation in such cases is the 
ongoing conflict or war with no tangible outcomes or prospect of improvement when 
both parties are paying huge costs. Moreover, recent findings on the emergence of 
essentialist thinking about religion among children in Northern Ireland shows that 8-year-
olds, but not 6-year-olds, view the category of religion as an important basis for social 
inference (Smyth, Feeney, Eidson, & Coley, 2017). This highlights the role of social 
inconsistency or group conflict in making specific social categories salient to children 
and, thereby, leading to category-specific essentialist views.  
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 Interestingly, even novel groups described briefly in an experimental setting as 
competing with each other also lead children as young as 4 years to categorize the groups 
consistent with an essentialist bias (Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). Presumably, an 
essentialist interpretation in these cases explains away the “anomaly” of conflict or 
competition by assuming that the groups are “essentially” different and, therefore, 
naturally in conflict with one another. However, there are other kinds of causal anomalies 
that may contribute to the essentialization of certain categories without emphasizing 
conflict. Simple differences between people, for example, such as mere labels that 
“assign” people to different groups in the absence of any other cues to differences 
(Catholic, Protestant) can also trigger the essentialist mode of thinking in order to explain 
the different labels.  
 In Chapter 2, we discuss the results from a cross-cultural study on the 
development of essentialist beliefs about different social categories in light of these two 
models. We argue that although the interplay between cultural factors (e.g. different 
gender roles) and cognitive factors (e.g. unsatisfactory mental justifications or 
explanations) explains variation in the form and degree of essentialist beliefs, it is the 
conceptualization of certain categories as biological or pseudo-biological that triggers 
essentialist beliefs irrespective of other factors. However, we also acknowledge that the 
specific questions we have used to measure essentialist beliefs may not converge with 
some of the scales used in the literature, although they have been used by others in the 
field (see Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007; Heiphetz, Gelman, & Young, 2017). 
Specifically, it is important to note that research on social categorization suggests a clear 
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divide between two sets of beliefs that are generally referred to by “essentialism” in the 
social domain. One set of beliefs, sometimes termed entitativity, refers to the extent to 
which a human category is perceived as unified, coherent, meaningful, and informative; 
the other set of beliefs centers around a conception of social categories as natural kinds, 
assuming a degree of “naturalness” in social categories. The latter set is composed of 
ideas about immutability, underlying causality, existential necessity, and imperviousness 
to influences from the environment (Haslam et al., 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007); it is 
this set of beliefs that when applied to social categories leads to a representation of social 
categories as what has been sometimes referred to as “naturalized” (Haslam et al., 2000) 
or “pseudo-natural kinds” (Boyer, 1993). With this distinction in mind, it is clear that 
some of the studies reviewed above focus on the entitativity aspect (e.g. Deeb, Segall, 
Ben-Elinyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011) and others on the natural-kind aspect (e.g. Rhodes 
& Gelman, 2009; Roberts & Gelman, 2017; Diesendruck & Haber, 2008) of social 
essentialism. Moreover, in studying each aspect (entitativity and natural-kind), different 
tasks have been used. Some have measured the pattern of children’s inferences based on 
category membership (e.g., Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006), while others have focused on 
beliefs about change versus stability of category membership (see Kinzler & Dautel, 
2012), or on children’s judgments about the extent to which category membership is 
objective versus artificial and arbitrary (see Diesendruck et al., 2013; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009). The questions we used in Studies 1-3 measure children’s beliefs about biological 
aspects of social category membership (e.g. whether group membership is identifiable in 
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blood) as well as beliefs about change versus stability. These questions together tap into 
the natural-kind aspect of social category essentialism.  
 
Intergroup Relations and Morality in Children 
Although in the biological domain, essentialist construction of categories may 
facilitate learning (but see Shtulman & Shulz, 2008; Leslie, 2013, for a discussion of how 
essentialism can hinder scientific understanding), in the social domain, essentialist 
psychology can have serious negative consequences. Among adults, essentialism has 
been found to relate to stereotype endorsement (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), prejudice 
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002), and representing the out-group as less human 
(Leyens et al., 2001). These correlations have important implications for lay theories of 
intergroup relations. They suggest that essentialism may guide the cognitive processes 
that lead to in-group favoritism and out-group bias, both well documented in adults and 
children. Consistent with the domain-general account of essentialist thinking, Yzerbyt, 
and Rocher (2002), and Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997) have proposed that 
essentialist lay theories play an important role in explaining intergroup stereotyping and 
justifying objective differences between social roles and group status. Consequently, in a 
social context, the role of essentialist beliefs in providing mental justification for 
anomalies (e.g., differential treatment of minority groups) has significant moral 
implications, because it can guide how people justify individual actions (e.g., 
stereotyping) or political systems (e.g., welfare system). 
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In developmental psychology, the link between children’s own group affiliations 
and preferences for the in-group as well as implicit and explicit bias against the out-group 
has been well-documented (see Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, & Spelke, 2009; Patterson & 
Bigler, 2006; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; McLoughlin, Tipper, & Over, 2016; 
McLoughlin & Over, 2017) However, only a few studies have focused on documenting 
possible links between intergroup relations and children’s moral judgments about 
interactions between others, irrespective of children’s own group affiliations. Among 
these, Rhodes and Chalik (2013) created novel, experimental groups and presented 
children with interactions between members of the same or different groups, without 
assigning children to a specific group. The results showed that 3-9-year old children who 
reasoned about characters from novel, experimental groups harming each other, viewed 
within-group harm as a strict moral violation, but judged between-group harm to be a 
violation of social rules and regulations, a less serious offense. Rhodes (2014) argues that 
group membership signals information about interrelated obligations. Thus, children 
represent social categories as coherent units of people who have certain obligations and 
duties toward in-group members, but not necessarily toward out-group members. One 
such obligation is to avoid harm, and since these obligations apply more obviously and 
inherently to the in-group, avoiding harm to the out-group is regarded as an obligation 
that is imposed only by social, extrinsic rules. Rhodes and her colleagues make an 
important theoretical claim about social categories serving as markers of interrelated 
obligations for children, and therefore leading to group biases in the social and moral 
domain; however, the question remains why social categories may mark cognitively 
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coherent units that demarcate people’s obligations only in relation to within –, and not 
between – group interactions. One possible answer to this question is that essentialist 
reasoning about social categories contributes to how much categories are viewed as 
markers of moral obligations.  
Notice, however, that the details of a proposed specific mechanism for the role of 
essentialist reasoning in intergroup relations will depend on how essentialism itself 
operates in the social domain. Namely, going back to the two different models of social 
essentialism, essentialization of social categories can directly lead to intergroup moral 
biases simply in virtue of presenting a view of social categories as having different 
biological essences, and thus having a nature that is biologically fixed and unchanging 
(see Possibility 1 below for a discussion of evidence on associations between people’s 
moral principles and their views about reality as fixed and unchanging), or it can 
indirectly lead to intergroup biases only when a belief in biological differences between 
members of various social groups is transformed into something more than simple 
differences by social anomalies and inconsistencies pertaining to these groups. 
Specifically, on the second possibility, differential treatment of groups in society, when 
these groups are already represented by people as “essentially” different, can send the 
message that the perceived biological differences matter in the social and moral domain. 
Below, we discuss these two possible mechanisms for the role of social essentialist 




Possibility 1. Biological representation of social categories: Essentialism 
presents a view of social categories as “fixed” and “unchanging”; this in turn 
influences moral principles.  
The work on adult moral conceptions suggests that the degree to which one values 
obligations rather than fundamental human rights in moral reasoning depends on how 
much they conceive of reality as fixed and unchanging, rather than socially constructed 
(Chiu, Dweck, & Tong, 1997). Specifically, when individuals believe in a fixed reality, 
they focus on fundamental duties and obligations towards others, whereas individuals 
who believe in a malleable reality tend to focus on moral principles, such as human 
rights. Because one of the major dimensions of psychological essentialism is the view 
that category boundaries are fixed and unchanging, rather than malleable and socially 
constructed, the link between conceptions of morality and essentialism is evident in light 
of the findings from Chiu et al., (1997). Specifically, strong essentialist beliefs among 
adults can lead to a focus on duties and obligations in social interactions, and drawing the 
link to inter-group morality, duties can reasonably be understood as more binding among 
members of the same social group and less so among members of different social groups. 
Consistent with this possibility, children may also assume that obligations between 
people are governed by group norms, especially because by early childhood, children 
show sensitivity to in-group and out-group distinctions, and show preference for their in-
groups even if group membership is established by trivial commonalities (e.g. shirt color) 
(Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). In fact, 3-9-year old children believe that in-group 
members are intrinsically obligated to one another, whereas interactions between in-
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group and out-group members are regulated by extrinsic rules (Rhodes & Chalik, 2014). 
Comparing these patterns with research on adults’ moral reasoning and links to 
essentialist psychology, it is possible that essentialist thinking leads to biased moral 
reasoning in inter-group contexts also among children. If true, then stronger essentialist 
thinking about a particular social category would predict a greater willingness to accept 
moral transgressions committed against out-group members as compared to 
transgressions between in-group members of that social category.  
Possibility 2. “Making sense” of anomalies: If an important consequence of 
essentialism in the social domain is explaining social anomalies and inconsistencies 
(e.g. group discrimination in society), it can lead to intergroup moral biases, by 
“naturalizing” these inconsistencies.  
A second possible mechanism for a link between social essentialism and inter-
group, moral biases arises from the model of essentialism that focuses on the role of 
essentialist psychology in making sense of “anomalies”. Recall that on this model, one of 
the consequences of social essentialism is that it makes sense of otherwise unexplained 
social realities (i.e. racism, sexism, or any other kind of social discrimination). 
Observation of inconsistent or contradictory social standards and practices, on this 
account, triggers cognitive dissonance which the essentialist mode of thinking in the 
social domain can reduce by “explaining” these irregularities, thereby “naturalizing” and 
making sense of the anomalous social structure. Thus, imagine, for example, a 
community in which children regularly observe a lack of concern or sensitivity towards a 
certain group of people, say immigrants, but otherwise witness relatively friendly, warm, 
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and caring attitudes among everyone else. In this situation, children will presumably 
come to hold with contradictory mental representations of the diverse members of their 
own community, which they then cognitively make sense of by coming to believe that 
immigrants must be essentially, inherently, and meaningfully different “kinds” of human 
beings than “non-immigrants”. This essentialization process then has the power to 
introduce the differential attitudes towards immigrants as “natural” and give rise to the 
more general expectation that different moral standards apply to interactions with 
immigrants. If this account is accurate, then children’s essentialist beliefs and moral 
judgments will change with age as they encounter more social anomalies that require 
explanation. Moreover, essentialist beliefs and moral biases should only occur for social 
categories for which conflicts between in-group and out-group members are evident. The 
specific social categories affected should also vary by society based on local group 
conflicts and discriminatory practices. 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, we discuss our findings on a possible link between social 
essentialism and intergroup morality in light of the above two possibilities. 
 
The Present Studies  
Extending two lines of prior research, one on children’s moral development in the 
context of groups, and the other on children’s early social essentialist bias, the present 
work discusses findings on the following theoretical questions: 1. What does the cross-
cultural and developmental pattern of social essentialism reveal about why social 
categories are essentialized (i.e. what does it tell us about the biological model of social 
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essentialism versus the role of social anomalies)? 2. Does social essentialism moderate 
intergroup moral biases, and if so, what is the underlying mechanism? To test these 
questions, we selected a number of real social categories – as opposed to novel, 
experimental groups – to measure cross-cultural and developmental patterns of 
essentialist beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards actual social categories.   
 In Chapter 2, three studies will be presented on cross-cultural investigation of the 
development of essentialist beliefs. Results will be discussed in terms of the different 
models of essentialism laid out in the introduction. Results will also be broken down by 
dimension of essentialist beliefs (biological, change/stability, and the effects of the 
environment).  
 In Chapter 3, one large study will be presented, investigating the hypothesized 
link between social essentialism and inter-group bias in children’s moral reasoning. 





 CHAPTER 2 
ESSENTIALIZATION OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES ACROSS DEVELOPMENT 
IN TWO CULTURES 
 
The tendency to essentialize social groups appears pervasive but the particular 
social groups that are essentialized within any given culture can be learned and certain 
categories that are likely to have a biological basis, for example gender, may be more 
strongly essentialized than others (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; 
Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Diesendruck, Goldfein-
Elbaz, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 2013). In this chapter, we assessed the 
developmental pattern of children’s essentialist thinking about five social categories in 
Turkey, a Muslim-majority culture. In a follow-up study, we examined essentialist 
thinking about the same five categories by children in the U.S. Finally, in a third study, 
we measured adults’ essentialist thinking for the same five categories in both countries. 
 Some aspects of essentialist thinking about social categories appear to be 
universal. Adults, in the situations and cultures studied to date, tend to hold essentialist 
beliefs about social categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, and social class 
(Hirschfeld, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Gil-White, 2002; Prentice & 
Miller, 2007; Atran 1998; Haslam 1998; Rehder, 2007; Smiler & Gelman, 2008; 
Mahalingam, 2003). Indeed, ethnographic studies have shown that people from very 
different cultures may each have a concept similar to the notion of “essence”: kunam 
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among Tamil speakers in southern India, blood among Aborigines of Australia (Gelman 
& Hirschfeld, 1999), and hau, or the spirit of possessions among the Maori people of 
Polynesia (Mauss, 1954).  
Research on the development of essentialist beliefs about social categories in 
children suggests an early, universal tendency that is nevertheless influenced by cultural 
experiences (Hirschfeld, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Sousa, Atran, & Medin, 2002; 
Astuti, Solomon, Carey, 2004; Waxman, 2010; del Rio & Strasser, 2010; Diesendruck & 
Haber, 2009; Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck et al., 2013; Deeb et al.,, 2011). For 
example, although children as young as four years of age in different contexts and 
cultures essentialize some social categories, Israeli kindergarteners are more likely than 
their North American peers to believe that ethnicity is an objective social category 
(Diesendruck et al.,, 2013). Within the US, although 5- and 7-year olds living in urban 
and rural communities treat gender as a natural kind, 10- and 17-year olds in rural 
communities are more likely to treat gender as a natural kind compared to their peers in 
urban communities (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  
 Prominent accounts of social essentialism posit that variations in the essentialist 
bias over the course of development and across contexts suggest a universal tendency for 
perceiving natural essences in all living things, which is then instantiated in culture-
dependent ways (Hirschfeld, 1998; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). In the social 
domain, this implies that essentialist conceptions of specific social categories are likely to 
depend on experience and exposure through different mechanisms of cultural 
transmission. Some accounts suggest that essentialist beliefs with respect to particular 
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social categories emerge in different ways in the course of historical time, and may play 
an important role in furthering the specific political and economic aims of certain groups 
(Guillaumin, 1980; Fuss, 1989). Thus, cultural and historical input can significantly 
shape how children learn to essentialize particular social categories within their 
community.   
 As children learn about the relevant social categories in their communities, they 
may essentialize different groups to different degrees. One possible reason for this 
variation concerns the existence of anomalous social facts that lack a clear explanation 
(Gelman & Hirschfield, 1999). According to this account, children witness or hear about 
differences between social groups (e.g., gender or racial discrimination, ongoing conflict 
between ethnic groups) and use essentialist thinking as a causal explanation. For 
example, Israeli children have stronger essentialist beliefs about ethnicity (Israeli and 
Arab) compared to gender, race, animal, or artifact categories (Diesendruck et al., 2013). 
Consistent with this account, when novel groups are briefly described in an experimental 
setting as in competition, children as young as 4 years are more likely to view the groups 
as essentially different (Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). By implication, the “anomaly” of 
conflict or competition between the groups is “explained” by assuming that they are 
inherently and invariably different, and, therefore, “naturally” in conflict with one 
another.  
Another explanation of why categories are more or less susceptible to essentialist 
thinking is that children may make inferences based on how often they hear about people 
changing categories. For example, children might rarely learn about individuals who 
	  	  
21 
change their gender but sometimes hear about individuals who change their religious 
affiliation. Learning about individual differences within a given social category may also 
reduce the tendency to believe that the category is natural and immutable. Indeed, Deeb 
et al. (2011) found that children who attended integrated Jewish/Arab schools in Israel 
had weaker essentialist beliefs about ethnicity compared to peers attending Jewish-only 
or Arab-only schools. 
 In the present study, we are interested in how children in different societies 
essentialize particular social categories to different degrees and how this pattern of 
differentiation changes with age. In Study 1, we compared essentialist thinking about five 
different social categories – gender, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, and 
sports-team fan – among children in Turkey, a Muslim-majority country with a history of 
ethnic and religious conflict, as well as high socioeconomic stratification. Gender is 
typically highly essentialized by children and thus provided an anchor category for 
comparison (Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009; Diesendruck et al., 2013). We chose the 
categories of religion and nationality to test the possible influence of current, as well as 
historical, tension between social groups on children and adults’ social essentialist 
beliefs. In addition, we assessed socio-economic status (rich, poor), which has not been 
tested broadly, but has been found to be highly essentialized among Chilean children (del 
Rio & Strasser, 2010) and less essentialized among Israeli children (Diesendruck & 
Haber, 2009). Lastly, we included sports-team fan groups, a category linked to personal 
preference and local ties, which we expected to have the lowest degree of 
essentialization. In Study 2, we measured essentialist beliefs about the same categories 
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among children in the U.S., and in Study 3, we compared adults’ essentialist thinking 
about these categories in both countries. 
 In comparing essentialist thinking across five categories in Turkey and the U.S., 
we anticipated two different, but not mutually exclusive, outcomes with respect to both 
the developmental trajectory of the various categories and the degree of similarity to be 
expected between Turkey and the U.S. First, if essentialism is in the social domain plays 
the role of an interpretative strategy that is recruited to explain discrimination and 
conflict between members of different social groups, it will increase in the course of 
development for those categories where children gather more information about 
discrimination and conflict between relevant groups – even though, it is likely to exist 
early on among children for those categories that present themselves as more similar to 
biological categories (e.g., Gender), regardless of social conflict between groups. In 
addition, particular social categories are likely to display a distinct developmental 
signature in Turkey as compared to U.S. given their different history with respect to 
gender relations, as well as religious and ethnic/national conflict. From this perspective, 
the category of sports-team fans might also be affected given competition between 
groups, although team rivalries may be understood as competition “in good fun” in 
contrast to the more severe historical conflicts between different ethnic/national and 
religious groups. Second, if essentialism is a mode of thinking that is primarily directed at 
natural kinds but is over-extended – at least in early childhood – to those specific social 
categories that may seem to children as biologically relevant, then we can expect a 
developmental decline in essentialist thinking for those social categories that have no 
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apparent biological underpinning. Specifically, children should essentialize 
socioeconomic status and sports-teams affiliation early in development, but these effects 
should decrease with age. In contrast, gender should remain highly essentialized given 
surface similarities to biological kinds. Indeed, we can reasonably expect a similar pattern 




Istanbul, Turkey  
Turkey is a country with a majority Muslim and ethnic Turk population. 
However, many other ethnic and religious groups are also represented in the society and 
the country has witnessed tension between different ethnic and religious groups 
throughout its history (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Ergil, 2000; Kirisci & Winrow, 1997; 
Moudouros, 2014). An emphasis on a common nationalist identity after the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 coincided with an increase in ethnic conflict in the 
country (Bozdoğan, & Kasaba, 1997; Kirisci & Winrow, 1997). Today, the formal 
education system in Turkey highlights nationalistic values, and includes compulsory 
courses in religion teaching primarily Sunni Islam (Kaya, 2015). Even though the gender 
hierarchy and distinct gender roles are less apparent in urbanized families with higher 
education levels, the contemporary Turkish society is characterized as patriarchal (Fişek 
and Sunar, 2005). 
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Although essentialist beliefs among adults and children have been studied among 
non-Western populations, we are not aware of any developmental studies on this topic in 
Muslim majority countries. This is an important gap in the literature, given that the 
practice of Islam is an important and salient aspect of everyday life in Turkey, feeding 
into meaningful experiences for children. For children growing up in Turkey, then, 
religious categories may thus be particularly marked and religious beliefs may influence 
the essentialization of other social categories.  
 The participants in Turkey were 5- to 10-year old children in Istanbul. This age 
range was selected to permit comparison with prior cross-cultural work on children’s 
social essentialism, and specifically with the findings of Diesendruck et al. (2013) who 
tested 5- and 10-year-olds. We included all the ages in between 5 and 10 years in order to 
obtain a more fine-grained assessment of developmental change.  
Essentialism Measure  
 “Essentialism” is an umbrella term for a set of interrelated beliefs; among these 
beliefs, some contribute to the cognitive representation of social categories as natural 
kinds, including the conception of category members as sharing an innate potential, 
impervious to environmental influences, immutable, and biological (Gelman, Heyman, & 
Legare, 2007; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). To capture this multifaceted 
construct in the current study, we adapted a measure previously used in studies of 
essentialism about psychological traits (Gelman et al., 2007) and beliefs and opinions 
(Heiphetz, Gelman, & Young, 2017), which incorporates the aforementioned aspects of 
essentialist thinking. We made small changes to the wording of the questions to focus 
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them on social categories. Specifically, we asked all of the questions about two people at 
the same time, one from each group of a given social category. The specific manner in 
which we asked the questions allowed us to measure the essentialist bias as the tendency 
to reason about social categories in terms of differences between members of two groups 
within each category. For example, for the category of religion, questions were 
simultaneously asked about two individuals who were members of two different religious 
groups, Muslim and Christian. Participants were asked about whether: (i) their brains are 
different from one another; (ii) whether their blood bears information about their 
religious affiliation; (iii) whether they were born with their religious affiliations, (iv) 
whether they can change their religious affiliation, and (v) whether being affiliated with a 
certain religion is in virtue of their environment. However, as noted in the previous 
chapter, social essentialism has been operationalized in a number of ways in different 
studies, and there is no agreement among researchers about which aspect of essentialist 
thinking best captures patterns of essentialist beliefs about social categories. Moreover, 
using the same dimensions we used in Studies 1, 2, and 3, Gelman, Heyman, and Legare 
(2007) showed that different dimensions of essentialism do not cohere among children 
before the age of 9, when some aspects start to show interrelatedness. To check for how 
the specific measure we used affects the patterns of our results, at the end of this chapter, 
we present relevant analyses on the individual dimensions of essentialist thinking among 
children and adults.  
 The specific groups representing each category in Turkey were selected in 
consultation with Turkish collaborators and after pilot testing. For the categories of 
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gender, religion, and SES, the groups representing them were: boy, girl; Muslim, 
Christian; and rich, poor, respectively. For the category of nationality, “Macedonian” was 
chosen as a comparison to “Turk”. These groups include people with very similar 
backgrounds and physical appearance, yet they are labeled differently. Note that 
“Macedonian” can also refer to an ethnic group within Turkey, although in the current 
study, when children asked, Macedonians were described as “people who live in 





 74 children between 5 and 10 years of age (M = 7.90, SD = 1.55, 43 females) 
participated in Study 1. An additional 6 children were excluded because they were 
outside of the target age range (N = 5) or lacked birthdate information (N = 1).   
 In Turkey, directly asking parents to identify their own and their children’s 
race/ethnicity is seen as a sensitive matter and so instead we asked about languages 
spoken at home. We then used the language information as an indirect measure of 
ethnicity; 66% of the parents indicated “only Turkish” or “Turkish” and another non-
ethnic language (e.g., English), 20% indicated a variety of languages spoken commonly 
by ethnic minority or immigrants in Turkey (i.e., Kurdish, Georgian, Arabic, Russian), 
and for 14% this information was not available. 
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 All children lived in Istanbul and were recruited from summer school programs 
and citywide cultural centers. Most children came from lower-middle or middle 
socioeconomic backgrounds, as they were visitors to tuition-free cultural centers in 
lower-middle and middle SES neighborhoods.   
 The study was approved by a local university IRB. 
 
Design 
 Children were tested individually in quiet rooms at cultural centers or summer-
school camps. They were shown five pairs of characters in a random order, for a total of 
five trials, each pair representing one of the five social categories of interest: Gender, 
Ethnicity, Religion, SES, and Sports-Teams Fan (see Figure 1). In addition, all children 
first viewed one character for a brief warm-up trial. All categories were illustrated with 
generic, same-gender characters (except for the category of gender), gender-matched with 
the participant, on a white background. All characters were referred to by letters of the 
alphabet. The specific letters were selected after piloting various letters in each country. 
Letters were used in order to prevent children’s prior experiences with actual names 





Figure 1. Stimuli used in Turkey (left panel) and those used in the U.S. (right panel) to 
represent each Category. For male participants, all characters were males, except the girl 
in the Gender category.  
 
 For each category, two characters were shown to the children representing 
members of two groups within that category, and each character was labeled as a member 
of one of two groups (Figure 1). For Gender, one character was labeled as a boy, the 
other as a girl. For Religion, one was labeled a Muslim, the other a Christian. For 
Nationality, one was labeled a Turk, the other a Macedonian. For SES, one was labeled 
as poor, the other as rich, and lastly for Sports-Team, the two characters were labeled as 
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fans of one of the three most popular soccer teams in Istanbul, “Fenerbahçe”, 
“Galatasaray”, and “Beşiktaş”. These teams were selected because in Istanbul, most 
people are likely to be a fan of one of them. Slight visual variations between the 
characters were introduced to signal their membership of different groups. For Gender, 
hairstyle and color of clothing distinguished the boy and the girl. For Nationality and 
Religion, characters also differed with respect to the color of clothes and hairstyle. For 
SES and Sports-Team, we added overt features to differentiate the characters given that 
less is known about how children recognize these different groups. Thus, in addition to 
different colors of clothes and different hairstyles, patches were added to the pants of the 
poor character and the sports-team fans wore jerseys of their team.  
 Children’s parents filled out a short questionnaire, asking them to indicate their 
own gender, favorite soccer team, age, education level, monthly income, and occupation, 
as well as languages (other than Turkish) spoken at home and their child’s gender. 
Children were asked about their favorite soccer team verbally before starting the 
experiment. Questions about religion or ethnicity were not directly asked, as requested by 
the local collaborators and administrators where testing occurred. As noted earlier, we 
obtained an indirect measure of ethnicity by asking about the language spoken at home.  
  To prepare the materials, they were first drafted in English, then revised after 
several consultation sessions with Turkish collaborators and finalized in English, then 
translated into Turkish by a local graduate student living in Istanbul, fluent in both 
Turkish and English. The Turkish translations were again revised based on pilot testing 
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sessions, and then back translated into English by the same graduate student and the 
second author. All testing was completed with the final translations in Turkish. 
 
Procedure 
 Children were told that they would be shown pictures of various people and asked 
questions about them. They were also told that they could answer all the questions with 
“yes”, “no”, or “maybe”, before being given the warm-up trial. In the warm-up trial, the 
experimenter presented a character, labeled him or her with a letter name and asked 
children if they thought the character “goes to school” and “likes ice cream”, as two 
separate questions. The experimenter did not give any feedback, because the purpose of 
the warm-up was simply to familiarize children with the range of possible answers. 
Children then received five trials in random order, each corresponding to one of the five 
social categories tested. For each trial, the experimenter presented a pair of characters and 
labeled each character in the pair as belonging to a group from the relevant social 
category. For example, for the category of religion, the experimenter presented two 
characters side-by-side on the table, and labeled one as a Muslim and the other as a 
Christian. Order of labeling and left-right position were randomized. Children then 
answered five questions about the characters, focusing on different aspects of essentialist 
thinking. The five questions were based on prior research on different dimensions of the 
natural-kind aspect of essentialist thinking (Gelman et al., 2007; see Appendix – (S) for 
all questions). Prior to testing, we created fourteen random orders of the five questions 
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for use within each age group (5-6, 7-8, 9-10 years of age). Each participant received one 
order of the questions for all of the social categories.  
 Children received a score of 1 for every essentialist response. For the born, blood, 
and brain questions, the essentialist response is “yes”; thus, these three questions were 
coded as 1 for a “yes”, 0 for a “no”, and 0.5 for a “maybe”. For the change and 
environment questions, the essentialist response is “no”; thus, these were reverse coded 
(i.e., 0 for “yes”, 1 for a “no”, and 0.5 for a “maybe” response). This coding scheme is 
consistent with prior work, (Gelman et al., 2007; Heiphetz et al., 2017). 
All responses were live-coded by the experimenter, entered, and checked against the 
coding sheet by two different research assistants. 
   Note that the five essentialism questions were asked about both characters 
simultaneously, rather than focusing on each character in the pair individually. For 
example, the brain question was: “Do you think that B’s brain is different from G’s 
brain?” and the born question was: “Do you think that B was born a Muslim and G was 
born a Christian?” for the category of religion. After completing these five questions, 
children were asked two control questions, one about each of the two characters 
individually, notably whether each character has a lot of friends (e.g., “Do you think B 
has a lot of friends?” and “Do you think G has a lot of friends?”). The friends questions 
were included to assess children’s possible bias toward either of the two characters. They 
also served as fillers before questions about a new category (a new pair of characters) 
were asked. For each of the control questions, children received a score of 1 for a “yes” 
response, 0.5 for “maybe”, and 0 for a “no” response.  
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  For each participant, a total essentialism score for a given social group was 
calculated by summing up the participant’s scores across the five individual essentialism 
questions (a range of 0 – 5). All results are presented in terms of participants’ total 
essentialism scores. In the current paper, we were interested in a comparison between the 
categories on the composite score. However, an analysis of the individual questions from 
our essentialism measure, by age and category is included in the Appendix. 
 
Results   
 We ran regression models with Age as a continuous variable. These analyses 
tested the effect of Age on essentialist beliefs about each of the five social categories of 
interest (Gender, Ethnicity, Religion, SES, Teams). In order to assess how the degree of 
essentialization varied between social categories and changed with age, we also 
conducted regressions for each age group separately (5-6-year-olds, 7-8-year-olds, 9-10-
year-olds). 
  All analyses of the essentialism scores were carried out using R statistical 
software (version 3.1.1, R Core Development Team, 2014).  
 
Do essentialist beliefs about each category change with age? 
 
 Figure 2 (left panel) shows Turkish children’s essentialism scores as a function of 
Age and Category (see Appendix for all means and standard errors). To test for the 
effects of age on children’s essentialism scores for each category, we ran five mixed 
effects regression models, one for each social category. For all regression models, we 
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mean-centered Age (in years), which makes the intercept interpretable as the expected 
essentialism score at the mean age of our sample (7.90 years). 
 
Figure 2. Total essentialism scores by age and social category – Turkey (left panel) and 
U.S (right panel) 
 
  As shown in Table 1, Age did not predict children’s essentialism scores for the 
categories of Gender, Nationality, Religion, or SES – despite the apparent differentiation 
among categories with age that is illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed in more detail 
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* p < 0.5, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 1. Results from mixed effects regression models with children’s Age (in years) as 
the predictor for each social category for Turkish children.  
 
How do essentialist beliefs about each category compare within different age groups? 
 The previous analyses examined essentialization for each category separately to 
assess change with age. To assess whether participants of a given age differentiated 
among the five social categories, we ran separate regression models for each age group 
(5-6-year-olds [N = 18], 7-8-year-olds [N = 25], 9-10-year olds [N = 31]. To provide a 
comparison of each category to all other categories, we reset the baseline category in the 
models. As shown in Table 2, and consistent with inspection of Figure 2, the results 
indicate that the five categories are increasingly differentiated with age in terms of the 
level of essentialist thinking that they elicit. Specifically, 5-6 year olds essentialized 
Gender to a higher degree than all other categories. They did not differentiate among 
Nationality, Religion and SES, but they essentialized Teams to a significantly lower 
degree than Nationality and Religion. Seven- to 8-year-olds essentialized Gender and 
Nationality significantly more than Religion, SES, and Teams. They also differentiated 
between Nationality and Religion. The oldest group of children, 9-10-year olds, 
differentiated among all of the categories, with the exception of SES and Religion. For 
Category                       Intercept Age (in years - centered) 
                           B SE           t                               B SE        t 





Nationality 3.43 0.12 27.52***  0.06 0.08 
Religion 3.05 0.13 22.67*** -0.09 0.09 
SES 2.71 0.10 26.45*** -0.06 0.07 -0.90 
Teams 2.18 0.11 20.66 *** -0.14 0.07   -2.31* 
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these older children, Gender was most highly essentialized followed by Nationality, 
Religion/SES, and Teams. In sum, the overall pattern revealed greater differentiation 
















* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 # Reference level in the comparison. 
 
Table 2. Comparisons between all levels of Category at each age group - Turkey. 
 
Discussion 
 The results from the Turkish sample allow a preliminary assessment of the two 
possible patterns of social essentialization outlined earlier. The youngest age group, 5-6 
year olds, demonstrated stronger essentialist beliefs about Gender than the other 
categories. By 7-8 years of age, children essentialized the categories to different degrees, 
and this pattern of differentiation grew stronger for the 9-10 year olds.  
 The first possible pattern predicted that groups for which conflict is prominent 
would be more highly essentialized, and perhaps increasingly so, as children learn about 
Comparisons 5-6-Year-Olds 7-8-Year-Olds 9-10-Year-Olds 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Gender (#) – Nationality    -0.64 (0.26)* -0.22(0.29)       -0.76 (0.21)*** 
Gender (#) – Religion     -0.53 (0.26)*     -0.92 (0.29)**       -1.77 (0.21)*** 
Gender (#) – SES      -0.85 (0.26)**       -1.40 (0.29)***       -1.42 (0.21)*** 
Gender (#) – Teams         -1.22 (0.26)***       -1.90 (0.29)***       -2.06 (0.21)*** 
Nationality (#) – Religion  -0.11(0.26)   -0.70 (0.29)*   -0.42 (0.21)* 
Nationality (#) – SES -0.21 (0.26)       -1.18 (0.29)***     -0.66 (0.21)** 
Nationality (#) – Teams    -0.58 (0.26)*       -1.66 (0.29)***       -1.31 (0.21)*** 
Religion (#) – SES -0.35 (0.26) -0.48 (0.29) -0.24 (0.21) 
Teams (#) – Religion    0.69 (0.26)*       0.96 (0.29)**        0.88 (0.21)*** 
Teams (#) – SES  0.37 (0.26)   0.29 (0.29)     0.64(0.21)** 
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ongoing group conflict. This suggests that in the context of Turkish society, with age, the 
categories of Gender, Nationality, and Religion, should become, or remain, highly 
essentialized. The findings of Study 1 are only partially consistent with these predictions. 
Although essentialist beliefs about the categories of gender and nationality are strong, 
and remain strong over the course of development, essentialist beliefs about religion 
become weaker in the course of development. This could be either because children’s 
experiences with group conflict in these categories are different, or it could be that the 
categories themselves are conceived as more or less biologically relevant, and 
essentialized accordingly.  
The second hypothesized pattern is consistent with both the greater differentiation 
between categories and the decline in essentialization for some categories with age. More 
specifically, it is plausible that children conceive of the categories of gender and 
nationality as having stronger biological underpinnings than the other categories, which 
leads to high levels of essentialist beliefs among all age groups for these categories (see 
Gil-White, 2001 for a review of Ethnic groups as ‘biological species’). 
To further assess the potential impact of group conflict and the perception of 
biological underpinnings, we conducted Study 2 with children in the US using the same 
social categories and the same measure of essentialism. Importantly, the US and Turkey 
differ in terms of historical and contemporary tensions between groups within particular 
social categories. For example, although U.S. society is still far from gender equality, 
urban children are not specifically socialized to essentialize gender differences, and 
compared to rural children, they have a more flexible view of gender by 10 years of age 
	  	  
37 
(Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Moreover, although ethnic and religious conflict is prevalent 
in the history of U.S. society, White children growing up in Boston may be less likely to 
be exposed to contemporary conflicts existing within U.S. society compared to children’s 
experiences growing up in Istanbul in the current, turbulent Turkish society. Moreover, 
compared to children growing up in Turkey, in close proximity to conflict and war, U.S. 
children may be less aware of civil and international conflict.   
In contrast to the group conflict hypothesis, children in both countries may tend to 
essentialize social categories (e.g. gender and ethnicity) to the extent that they conceive 
of these categories as biological or “pseudo-biological” (see Gil-White, 2005). If true, the 
developmental pattern of essentialization for any given social category should be quite 
similar despite historical and contemporary differences between the two countries. 
 
Study 2, U.S. 
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-three children between 5 and 10 years of age (M = 7.34, SD = 1.70, 39 
females) participated in the study. Two additional children participated but were excluded 
because they did not complete the study (N = 1) or were outside the target age range (N = 
1). 
 Sixty-two percent of the parents identified their children as “White – not of 
Hispanic origin”, 4% as “Black/African American”, 4% “Hispanic”, 3% as Asian/Pacific 
Islander, 3% as South Asian/Indian, 14% were identified as mixed-race (“White” and 
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other), 5% “Other”, and 4% chose not to answer this question. Children in the U.S. were 
visitors to a local science museum in Boston, recruited from a local school or tested in a 
university lab. Most children, recruited at the museum, came from a range of lower-
middle to upper-middle SES backgrounds (Soren, 2009).  
Design 
 Children were tested in a relatively quiet corner of a local museum exhibit or in 
quiet classrooms at a public school. Parents received a questionnaire asking them to 
identify their child’s gender, ethnicity, religion, and favorite baseball team, as well as 
their own education level, occupation, ethnicity, religion, and favorite baseball team.  
 The design of the study was the same as in Study 1. For presentation of all 
categories, the same characters as in Study 1 were used with the exception of the sports-
team fans who were illustrated wearing the jerseys of the relevant baseball teams. In the 
categories of gender, religion, and SES, the characters were labeled as in Study 1 (i.e., 
boy, girl; Muslim, Christian; and poor, rich, respectively). For nationality, the characters 
were labeled as American and British. We selected these nationalities in order to present 
the same kind of contrast as in Study 1: people who look alike and share a common 
background, but are labeled differently. For the category of sport-team fans, the 
characters were labeled as belonging to two popular baseball teams in the Northeast, the 
Red Sox and the Yankees. Changing the groups representing the two categories of 
ethnicity and sport-team fans between Study 1 and Study 2 ensured the local pertinence 





 All procedures were the same as in Study 1. The first author was present during 
all testing sessions in both studies and ensured that the same procedures were used. 
 
Results 
 The data were analyzed in the same way as in Study 1, using the same models.  
Do essentialist beliefs about each category change with age? 
 
 Figure 2 (right panel) shows the developmental pattern of US children’s 
essentialism scores for the five social categories tested (see Appendix for all means and 
standard errors). To test for the effects of age on children’s essentialism scores for each 
category, we ran five mixed effects regression models, one for each social category, 
centering Age (in years). As shown in Table 3, children’s essentialist beliefs about 
Gender significantly increased from 5 to 10 years of age. For the two categories of 
Religion and Nationality, there were no significant overall changes in children’s 
essentialist beliefs between 5 and 10 years of age. For the categories of SES and Teams, 









Category                    Intercept Age (in years - centered) 
                           B SE         t                            B SE        t 
Gender 4.10 0.09 45.51***     0.01 0.00     2.86** 
0.65 
 -0.39 
Nationality 3.40 0.11 30.79***     0.00 0.00 
Religion 3.12 0.12 25.89***     -0.00 0.00 
SES 2.53 0.10 25.91***     -0.02 0.00       -4.33*** 
Teams 2.18 0.10 22.06 ***     -0.03 0.00       -6.02*** 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3. Results from linear regression models with children’s Age (in years) as the 
predictor for each social category – US.  
 
How do essentialist beliefs about each category compare within different age groups? 
 Similar to the analyses in Study 1, we ran separate regression models for each age 
group: 5-6-year-olds [N = 25], 7-8-year-olds [N = 25], and 9-10-year-olds [N = 23]. As 
shown in Table 4, the results indicate a clear pattern of increasing differentiation with age 
in the level of essentialist thinking associated with the various categories. Specifically, as 
was the case for 5-6-year-olds in Turkey, 5-6-year-olds in the U.S. essentialize gender 
more than all other categories and all other categories are essentialized to the same 
degree. At 7-8-years, children continue to essentialize gender more than all other 
categories. However, although they essentialize nationality and religion to the same 
extent, they now essentialize both more than SES or teams. By 9-10-years, children 





















* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 # Reference level in the comparison. 
 
Table 4. Comparisons between all levels of Category at each age group – U.S. 
 
Turkey and US 
 As suggested by Figure 2 and by the regressions analyses, there are striking 
similarities, as well as some noteworthy differences, between Turkey and the US in the 
development of essentialist thinking about the five social categories.  In both societies, 
younger children differentiate less among the categories than do older children. In 
addition, the relative level of essentialist thinking across the five categories is broadly 
similar across the two cultures. For example, in both societies and throughout 
development, gender is the category that is most essentialized and sports team fan is the 
category that is the least essentialized.  
Turning to differences between the two studies, the main difference between 
children in the two countries is the effect of age on the degree of differentiation among 
the five categories. More specifically, as they get older, Turkish children display a 
modest increase in differentiation among the five categories accompanied by a significant 
Comparisons 5-6-Year-Olds 7-8-Year-Olds 9-10-Year-Olds 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Gender (#) – Nationality     -0.54 (0.20)**  -0.68 (0.21)**   -0.89 (0.21)*** 
Gender (#) – Religion       -0.74 (0.20)***   -0.74 (0.21)**  -1.50 (0.21)** 
Gender (#) – SES      -0.80 (0.20)***     -1.56 (0.21)***   -2.39 (0.21)*** 
Gender (#) – Teams       -0.90 (0.20)***      -2.00 (0.21)***   -2.91 (0.21)*** 
Nationality (#) – Religion  -0.20 (0.20) -0.06 (0.21) -0.61 (0.21)** 
Nationality (#) – SES -0.26 (0.20)       -0.88 (0.21)***   -1.50 (0.21)*** 
Nationality (#) – Teams   -0.36 (0.20)      -1.32 (0.21)***   -2.02 (0.21)*** 
Religion (#) – SES  -0.06 (0.20)      -0.82 (0.21)***   -0.89 (0.21)*** 
Teams (#) – Religion    0.16 (0.20)      1.26 (0.21)***   1.41 (0.21)*** 
Teams (#) – SES    0.10 (0.20)  0.44 (0.21)* 0.52 (0.21)* 
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decline in essentialist thinking for a single category, i.e., Teams. By contrast, as they get 
older, U.S. children display a considerable increase in differentiation among the five 
categories accompanied by a significant increase in essentialist thinking for gender and a 
significant decrease for both SES and Teams.  
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 reveal important similarities between the U.S. and Turkey 
in the development of essentialist beliefs for the five social categories. In the U.S., similar 
to the pattern observed among children in Turkey, the youngest children essentialized 
gender to a stronger degree than the other categories, an effect that increased with age in 
the U.S. With age, children in the U.S. also increasingly differentiated the categories such 
that by 9 to 10 years of age, all of the categories were significantly different from each 
other in terms of essentialization. Intriguingly, the order of essentialization of the 
categories was the same for children in both countries.  
The overall pattern of similarity in development lends support to the idea that 
some categories, and not others, are universally essentialized due to an apparent 
“essence” indicative of biological kinds. To further examine this hypothesis, in Study 3, 
we compared essentialist beliefs about the same five categories within a sample of adults 
from Turkey and the U.S. If specific categories (i.e., gender and nationality in this case) 
are essentialized to a higher degree than others because they are conceived as reflecting a 
biological essence, then adults in both Turkey and the U.S. should also essentialize these 
categories to a higher degree than other social categories. 
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Study 3, Adults 
 The cross-national similarities in the degree of essentialist thinking about the five 
categories, as well as cross-national differences in the effect of age on children’s 
essentialist bias about specific categories, raise a question about how adults’ essentialist 
beliefs about these same categories compare across the two countries. In Study 3, we 
made this comparison. We were particularly interested in whether a) the high degree of 
essentialization for Gender and Nationality observed in both countries persisted into 
adulthood, b) the differentiation between categories continued and c) the rank order of the 
categories in terms of the degree of essentialization remained the same. We tested college 
students at the two universities affiliated with this study. This choice of sample limits a 
direct comparison of the child and adult samples, given that the participants in these two 
samples did not come from completely equivalent backgrounds (particularly in Turkey). 
However, the adult samples in both countries are quite comparable to each other as 
explained in the next section.  
Method 
Participant 
 One hundred and seventeen adults (88 females) from Turkey and 106 adults (79 
females) from U.S. participated in Study 3. In Turkey, all participants were 
undergraduates studying psychology and other courses at a public, English medium, 
secular university in Istanbul. The university draws students from a wide range of 
socioeconomic backgrounds, because entrance is mainly dependent on nation-wide, 
examination-based ranking. The students are likely to be more westernized than the 
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average adult in Istanbul because they are young adults, fluent in English and studying at 
a university with an American academic system. In the U.S., participants were 
undergraduates in a psychology course at an urban, secular university. 
Design and Procedures 
 To keep our measures consistent, we used the same stimuli, questions, and coding 
system for adults as we had used for children in Studies 1 and 2. Participants completed 
identical procedures to the children, but they were presented with the test stimuli and the 
questions online through a Qualtrics program. Before starting the test procedure, adults 
read a statement that described the stimuli as “child-friendly” and explained that the 
purpose of the adult survey was to provide a comparison for children’s responses to the 
same questions. Participants in Turkey completed all steps in Turkish, and the U.S., 
participants completed the steps in English. 
Results 
 Figure 3 shows the pattern of essentialist thinking by Turkish and U.S. adults 
about the five categories (see Appendix for means and standard errors). As illustrated, 
adults essentialized the categories to a similar degree in both countries. To directly 
compare adults’ beliefs about each category across the two countries, we ran a regression 
model, for each social category, on adults’ essentialism scores with Country as the sole 
predictor. As shown in Table 5, Country did not predict adults’ essentialism score for the 
categories of gender, nationality, religion, or SES. However, U.S. adults tend to hold 
stronger essentialist beliefs about sports team fans compared to adults in Turkey, 
although still at a low level. 
	  	  
45 
 In addition, as shown in Table 6, the relative rank order of essentialist thinking 
about the categories is quite similar across the two countries. Both in Turkey and the 
U.S., adults hold strong essentialist beliefs about gender, followed by nationality, SES, 
religion, and sports-teams. As indicated in Table 6, adults in Turkey differentiate among 
all categories, as do adults in the U.S., with the exception of religion and teams. Thus, 
like the oldest group of children in each country, adults differentiate between the 
categories in terms of their level of essentialist thinking. However, unlike the pattern 
observed among the oldest group of children, adults in both countries essentialize religion 
to a lesser degree than SES.   
 
 









































* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 5. Results from linear regression models with Country as the predictor for adults’ 








* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 # Reference level in the comparison. 
 
Table 6. Comparisons between all categories among adults in each country. 
 
 These results show that just as children in Turkey and the US showed similar 
patterns of essentialist thinking for the five social categories, adults in both countries also 
look strikingly similar. Specifically, in both countries, adults’ essentialist thinking about 
the categories displays the following rank-order: Gender > Nationality > SES > Religion 
> Teams. Like 9-10-year olds in each country, adults differentiate between almost all 
categories, although they hold weaker essentialist beliefs about religion compared to 
Category                       Intercept Country (Turkey = reference) 
                           B SE           t                               B SE        t 





Nationality 2.27 0.10 22.77*** -0.05  0.14 
Religion 0.95 0.06 14.86*** 0.12 0.09 
SES 1.48 0.07 21.81*** -0.08 0.10 -0.78 
Teams 0.71 0.06 11.65 *** 0.18 0.09   2.05* 
Comparisons (Turkey)  (U.S.) 
 B (SE)  B (SE) 
Gender (#) – Ethnicity -0.82 (0.09)***  -0.74 (0.10)*** 
Gender (#) – Religion  -2.14 (0.09)***  -1.91 (0.10)*** 
Gender (#) – SES -1.61 (0.09)***  -1.57 (0.10)*** 
Gender (#) – Teams  -2.38 (0.09)***  -1.33 (0.10)*** 
Ethnicity (#) – Religion  -1.32 (0.09)***  -1.17 (0.10)*** 
Ethnicity (#) – SES -0.79 (0.09)***  -0.82 (0.10)*** 
Ethnicity (#) – Teams  -1.56 (0.09)***  -1.33 (0.10)*** 
Religion (#) – SES -0.53 (0.09)***  -0.35 (0.10)*** 
Teams (#) – Religion  0.23(0.09)**    0.16 (0.10) 
Teams (#) – SES  0.77 (0.09)***   0.51 (0.10)*** 
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SES, unlike children, who show the opposite pattern. The strong essentialist beliefs about 
gender and nationality among adults in both countries further supports the hypothesis that 
some, but not all, social categories are essentialized to high degrees and remain highly 
essentialized throughout development, perhaps because they are conceived as indicative 
of important biological differences between people.   
 
Dimensions of Social Essentialism Among Children and Adults Across Categories 
Evidence for the second possibility laid out in the introduction of this chapter 
comes primarily from the pattern of data in Studies 1, 2, and 3, showing that across ages 
and the cultures studied, the categories of Gender and Nationality were essentialized to 
higher degrees compared to the categories of Teams, and SES (and Religion, to some 
extent). Importantly, recall that both in Turkey and U.S, children essentialized the social 
categories roughly in the same order, from most essentialized to least: Gender < 
Nationality < Religion < SES < Teams. Moreover, adults in both countries also 
essentialized the categories in the same order, although SES and Religion changed places 
among adults compared to the pattern observed with children. Thus, for adults, the 
following order held: Gender < Nationality < SES < Religion < Teams. To check whether 
the same order holds in children’s and adults’ essentialist beliefs about these categories 
across the dimensions of essentialism we measured with the five questions in our 
essentialism scale, we combined the countries and examined adults’ and children’s 




Questions by Category  
Tables 7 and 8 show children’s and adults’ mean essentialization score for each 
question in each category. As shown on Table 7, the rank-ordering of children’s 
essentialist beliefs about the five categories is preserved regardless of question. For most 
questions, Gender is roughly the highest essentialized category, followed by Nationality, 
Religion, SES and Teams. As shown on Table 8, for adults also the same rank-ordering 
as the shown by the composite score was preserved across the individual questions. 
 
 
Table 7. Means (SD) of children’s answers to each question by Category – (country and 





Table 8. Means (SD) of adults’ answers to each question by Category – (country 
collapsed). 
 
Questions by Age and Category 
 As noted earlier in the introduction, various dimensions of essentialist reasoning 
measured by the questions used in Studies 1-3 do not necessarily cohere across age 
(Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). Therefore, it is important to analyze the pattern of 
essentialist thinking in children by dimension and specifically, to ask how the biological 
dimensions (i.e. born, brain, blood) interact with Category over the course of 
development. Specifically, do children essentialize those categories, which they possibly 
represent as biological more in terms of the biological aspects, but not necessarily in 
terms of the change or environment questions? Figure 4 shows the patterns of children’s 
essentialist reasoning about the five categories in terms of the specific dimensions, 








 To test the patterns shown in Figure 4, we conducted a 3X5X5, repeated measures 
ANOVA with Age Group as a between-subject factor and Category and Dimension as 
Within-Subject Factors. The results show a main effect of Category (F (4, 568) = 69.83, p 
< 0.001, ηp² = 0.33), a main effect of Dimension (F (4, 568) = 22.17, p < 0.001, ηp² = 
0.13), a Dimension X Age Group interaction (F (8, 568) = 3.20, p < 0.01, ηp² = 0.04), and 
importantly, a Category X Dimension X Age Group (F (32, 2272) = 2.15, p < 0.01, ηp² = 
0.03) and no effect of Age Group (F (2, 142) = 1.78, p = 0.17).  
 Following up on the highest-level interaction effect with simple effects tests, we 
found that among 5-6-year olds, the categories of Gender and Nationality are 
essentialized in terms of the birth question to higher degrees compared to all other 
categories (Born – Gender: M = 0.89 (0.04), Nationality: M = 0.83 (0.05), Religion: M = 
0.69 (0.07), SES: M = 0.60 (0.07), Teams: M = 0.57 (0.07)), with no difference between 
the other categories. At this age group, Gender is also different from all other categories 
in terms of how likely children believe it is to change group membership (Change – 
Gender: M = 0.76 (0.07), Nationality: M = 0.43 (0.08), Religion: M = 0.51 (0.07), SES: M 
= 0.38 (0.06), Teams: M = 0.52 (0.07)), with no difference between the other categories. 
The categories are not different with respect to any other dimension at this age group.  
 Likewise, among 7-8-year-olds, Gender and Nationality are significantly higher in 
terms of children’s essentialist beliefs about birth, compared to all other categories (Born 
– Gender: M = 0.90 (0.04), Nationality: M = 0.86 (0.05), Religion: M = 0.69 (0.06), SES: 
M = 0.53 (0.07), Teams: M = 0.43 (0.06)), with no differences between the other 
categories. Interestingly, at this age, children’s beliefs about differences in people’s 
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brains is lower in the category of Gender, compared to both Nationality and Religion 
(Brain – Gender: M = 0.73 (0.55), Nationality: M = 0.85 (0.05), Religion: M = 0.86 
(0.05)), with Nationality and Religion higher compared to Teams, but not compared to 
SES (SES: M = 0.78 (0.06), Teams: M = 0.73 (0.06)). Children’s essentialist reasoning in 
terms of differences showing in people’s blood at this age is highest for Gender, followed 
by Nationality and Religion essentialized to the same degree, followed by SES, and 
Teams as the lowest essentialized category (Blood – Gender: M = 0.80 (0.05), Nationality: 
M = 0.67 (0.06), Religion: M = 0.62 (0.06), SES: M = 0.38 (0.06), Teams: M = 0.25 
(0.05)). With respect to beliefs about change, essentialist beliefs are lowest in the 
category of SES, with Nationality, Religion, and Teams, all three essentialized to the 
same degree, and Gender essentialized highest than all other categories (Change: Gender: 
M = 0.78 (0.06), Nationality: M = 0.51 (0.07), Religion: M = 0.43 (0.07), SES: M = 0.22 
(0.06), Teams: M = 0.57 (0.07)). Essentialist beliefs about the influence of the 
environment are highest in the category of Gender, with all other categories essentialized 
to the same degree (Environment: Gender: M = 0.82 (0.05), Nationality: M = 0.69 (0.06), 
Religion: M = 0.60 (0.06), SES: M = 0.64 (0.06), Teams: M = 0.57 (0.07)).  
 Among 9-10-year old children, essentialist beliefs in terms of differences at birth 
are highest for the Category of Gender and Nationality, with Gender different from all 
other categories, Nationality different from all categories but Religion, and Religion 
different from SES and Teams, with SES and Teams also different (Born: Gender: M = 
0.94 (0.04), Nationality: M = 0.87 (0.04), Religion: M = 0.77 (0.06), SES: M = 0.55 
(0.06), Teams: M = 0.22 (0.06)). All categories are essentialized to the same extent with 
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respect to differences in the brain. With respect to differences in the blood, all categories 
are essentialized significantly differently from one another (Blood: Gender: M = 0.86 
(0.05), Nationality: M = 0.56 (0.06), Religion: M = 0.41 (0.06), SES: M = 0.27 (0.06), 
Teams: M = 0.12 (0.05)). Essentialist beliefs about change are highest in the category of 
Gender, followed by Nationality and Teams, followed by Religion and SES (Change: 
Gender: M = 0.76 (0.06), Nationality: M = 0.49 (0.07), Religion: M = 0.34 (0.06), SES: M 
= 0.19 (0.05), Teams: M = 0.60 (0.06)). In terms of the effects of the environment, 
essentialist beliefs are only uniquely high for Gender (Environment: Gender: M = 0.88 
(0.05), Nationality: M = 0.73 (0.07), Religion: M = 0.61 (0.06), SES: M = 0.68 (0.06), 
Teams: M = 0.60 (0.06)).  
 To sum up the patterns in children’s essentialist reasoning with respect to each 
dimension, at the youngest age, children uniquely essentialize Gender and Nationality 
mainly in terms of people being born a certain way (e.g. male, female, American, British) 
and not being able to change their group membership. All the other categories at this age 
are essentialized to same degree regardless of dimension. 7-8-year-olds, as well as 9-10-
year olds continue to essentialize Gender and Nationality in terms of birth and stability, 
while they also start to show beliefs about group membership showing in people’s bloods 
as well as lack of influence from the environment, while, interestingly, ideas about 
differences in people’s brains decrease for the category of Gender. Thus, with age, 
children continue to show hold strong essentialist beliefs about Gender and Nationality 




Questions by Age 
 To observe the overall pattern of specific essentialist dimensions, regardless of 
Category, we collapsed across category and looked at the relative strength of essentialist 
beliefs in terms of each question. As shown in Figure 4, children have stronger 
essentialist views for some questions compared to other questions. The strongest 
essentialist views apply to differences between people’s brains when they belong to 
different social groups followed by the idea that people are born as a member of a 
category (i.e. being born a Christian). Weaker essentialization is found for the belief that 
people’s blood carries information about their group membership; the belief that people 
cannot change their social groups; and lastly the idea that people’s social group 
membership is independent of the environment. With age, among the children, 
essentialism in terms of blood and environment decreases, but not in terms of brain, 
birth, or change. 
 For adults, some differences appear.  The highest essentialist views are in terms of 
being born a certain way and the limited role of environment. Essentialist views in terms 
of differences in the brain and the blood and ability to change categories are lowest 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	    
 
Figure 5. Children’s and adults’ essentialist answers by Question and age, summed up 
across all categories (country collapsed). 
 
General Discussion  
 The results of the three studies allow us to revisit the three hypotheses we outlined 
initially.  Recall that we proposed three possible patterns of development across the US 
and Turkey. The first possibility emphasized social essentialism as a powerful and 
universal cognitive bias, persisting with age and persisting across different cultural 
experiences. Our results do not support this prediction, because there are differences in 
essentialist beliefs by age in both countries. In each setting, the level of essentialist 
thinking about most of the social categories was quite similar among 5-6-year-olds but 
more differentiated among older children and adults.  
The second possibility focused on the role of conflict and discrimination in 
triggering an essentialized conception of some, but not all, categories. The results from 





























groups have been historically in conflict within Turkish society, was not highly 
essentialized among children and underwent a noticeable decline in essentialism by 
adulthood. Moreover, the similar pattern of differentiation observed in the course of 
development both in Turkey and the U.S. undermines the claim that essentialist thinking 
is mainly a response to historical or contemporary conflict between social groups.  
Finally, the third possibility emphasized essentialism as a mode of thinking that is 
employed primarily for representing natural kinds that have biological underpinnings, but 
is initially over-extended to the social domain. According to this hypothesis, categories 
that initially appear to have a biological basis will be essentialized in both cultures, but 
the level of essentialist thinking will decline with age for particular categories as children 
come to recognize the absence of any biological substrate. Our results support this third 
hypothesis, even if the role of cultural experience also warrants discussion. Below, we 
discuss the evidence for this hypothesis.  
 Both in Turkey and the U.S., gender is the most essentialized category among 
children and adults. In Turkey, however, arguably because of children’s early exposure to 
a more pronounced gender hierarchy, the prevalence of segregated gender roles and 
gendered socialization practices within the family context (e.g., Fişek & Sunar, 2005; 
Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982), essentialist thinking about gender starts off at a high level and 
remains high with age.  In the U.S. essentialist thinking about gender increases with age 
among children, perhaps because of exposure to gender stereotyping in school settings 
especially with respect to intellectual tasks (e.g., math and sciences) in the early school 
years. This pattern suggests a universal tendency to essentialize social categories that are 
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conceived as having biological underpinnings and an interplay with cultural experiences. 
Interestingly, among college-educated young adults, however, essentialist thinking about 
gender declines in both countries, raising intriguing questions about the developmental 
time-course of biologically-oriented thinking about gender. Presumably, compared to 
younger children, adolescents and young adults are more attuned to biological differences 
between the sexes, which should lead to a strong essentialist conception of gender. In 
fact, college students do show an essentialist bias about concepts associated with 
masculinity and femininity (Smiler & Gelman, 2008). However, although young adults 
may, in fact, be more attuned to and aware of biological differences between the sexes, 
other explicit reasoning processes may play a role in their responses to a simplified 
essentialism measure, designed primarily for children. In fact, when undergraduates 
participated in a task measuring their essentialist views about gender under a time 
constraint, they were more likely to essentialize behavioral properties based on gender, 
compared to participants in a delayed condition (Eidson & Coley, 2014). In a delayed 
condition, however, participants still essentialized physical and biological aspects of 
gender. The results of Study 3 suggest a similar process at work. Although adults show 
substantially lower essentialization compared to children, they retain a relatively high 
degree of essentialist bias about categories that are biologically relevant.    
 Consistent with the thesis that biological conception of categories plays an 
important role in the degree and developmental pattern of essentialist bias about social 
categories, essentialist thinking about categories with no clear biological underpinning 
decreases with age. Specifically, in both countries, the category of sports-teams fan is 
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essentialized to a lower degree compared to gender and nationality among children of all 
age groups and adults. Presumably, in both countries, children and adults realize that 
supporting a specific sports-team is a personal choice or a side effect of residing in a 
certain city or other factors that clearly do not involve a biological conception. In fact, 
when asked about the possibility of changing one’s favorite sports-team, children who 
spontaneously offered an explanation usually indicated that if one team becomes more 
“famous” or “wins” more often, then one may change one’s preferences and become a 
fan of this more successful team.    
 Interestingly, in both countries, essentialist beliefs about religion do not undergo 
significant changes during childhood, but go through a remarkable decline by the onset of 
adulthood. This similarity is especially noteworthy because the two countries are quite 
different with respect to the historical significance of religion, its contemporary 
relevance, and the current visibility of religious conflict. Nevertheless, a similar pattern 
of thinking about religion is observed among children and adults in the two countries. It 
is important to note that the child samples in the two countries differ with respect to 
exposure to religion. In Turkey, although we did not directly ask families to identify the 
religion they affiliate with, most families came from traditional, religious neighborhoods 
and most likely practiced Islam. In the U.S., however, 29% of the parents indicated that 
their children adhered to no religion. The adult samples in the two countries were more 
similar; in both countries, they consisted of undergraduate students at large 4-year 
universities and importantly, in Turkey, the adult sample included students at an English-
medium university with an American educational philosophy and practice. This similarity 
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between the adult samples may have increased the parallels in essentialist thinking about 
religion across the two countries, but the similarity observed among the children indicates 
the cross-national stability of the observed pattern, at least in childhood. 
 The cross-national similarity in the level essentialist thinking about all five 
categories, the high levels of essentialist thinking about gender and nationality, the lower 
levels essentialist thinking about and sports-teams, and the considerable decline in 
essentialist beliefs about religion from childhood to adulthood, all provide support for the 
proposal that some, but not all, social categories are represented as biological or pseudo-
biological “species” in human cognition.  These categories then, become prime 
candidates for essentialist beliefs, especially in the early years, although specific cultural 
experiences influence the developmental details. Here, the case of nationality is an 
interesting one. Although there has not been any systematic developmental research on 
children’s essentialist views about nationality (although see Cimpian, 2017), it is 
conceivable that children tune into biologically relevant cues, such as language, accent, 
and being born a certain way when thinking about different nationalities (see Kinzler et 
al., 2009; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012, for the role of language and accent in children’s social 
reasoning). Anecdotally, children who spontaneously offered explanations for their 
answers regarding the category of nationality during testing, often appealed to the 
characters being “born that way”, or speaking “different languages” even in the case of 
the American and the British stimulus pair. Gil-White (2005) argues for a biological 
conception of ethnicity, and it is possible that children’s and even adults’ concepts of 
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“nationality” closely match their concepts of “ethnicity”, with both concepts 
incorporating supposedly biological characteristics.  
 So far, we have emphasized important similarities between Turkey and the U.S. in 
the pattern of essentialist thinking observed in young children, in the pattern of 
differentiation that emerges in the course of childhood, and the degree of essentialist 
thinking across different social categories seen in adulthood. Nevertheless, it is important 
to underline several intriguing differences between the results obtained in Turkey and the 
U.S. First, although in both countries, children and adults clearly differentiate between 
the categories of interest, in Turkey, this differentiation seems to be emerging earlier 
compared to the U.S., since 5-6-year-olds in Turkey, in addition to gender, start to also 
differentiate nationality and religion from the lowest essentialized category. In the U.S. 
this differentiation emerges among the 7-8-year olds. Interestingly, however, although 
differentiation – of especially nationality and religion – emerges earlier in Turkey, in the 
older age groups (7-10 years of age), children in the U.S. show a stronger pattern of 
differentiation between all categories compared to Turkish children. Thus, children in 
Turkey differentiate between categories in their essentialist views somewhat earlier than 
children in the U.S., but among children in the U.S., there is greater differentiation once 
children do come to see the categories as differentially susceptible to an essentialist 
conception. However, these differences vanish when we compare adults in the two 
countries, perhaps because of the similarities among the specific group of adults we 
tested (i.e., college students at large, English medium universities in large cities).  
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 Another difference that is worth pointing out is in essentialist beliefs about SES. 
In Turkey, essentialist thinking about SES did not decline among the children (although it 
did in adulthood), whereas in the U.S., there is a significant decline even among the 
children. Although this could be an effect of the different cultural realities (or different 
perceived realities) with respect to economic mobility, it may also be due to differences 
in the demographics of our samples. In the U.S., our sample included a considerable 
proportion of children from middle-high economic backgrounds (with 38% of the parents 
reporting a higher education degree), whereas in Turkey, the participants came mostly 
from low-middle economic backgrounds (with 7% of the parents reporting a higher 
education degree). It is possible that different experiences or expectations between the 
two samples with respect to economic mobility affect the development of essentialist 
beliefs differently. More generally, the somewhat different demographics of our child 
samples from Turkey and U.S. may have accentuated some of the cross-national 
differences in the developmental patterns observed in children’s social essentialist bias.  
 Aside from a discussion of the specific patterns observed, two further points 
remain to be noted: the role of identity in children’s essentialization scores, and 
children’s possible patterns of bias towards one of the two characters in our stimuli. 
Recall that children in both Studies 1 and 2 were presented with a pair of characters for 
each category and each character in the pair was labeled as belonging to one group or 
another. The specific groups representing each category included a social group of the 
respective category that participants either identified with or were very familiar with 
(e.g., Turkish or American for nationality), and a different group that participants did not 
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identify with (e.g., Macedonian or British for nationality). Thus, the majority of children 
identified with one of the two characters, and this could have influenced their 
essentialism ratings (see Verkuyten & Brug, 2004 for the role of ethnic identification in 
essentialism among adolescents). To check whether identification did influence 
children’s essentialism scores, we compared essentialism scores between children who 
identified with one of the characters (e.g., those who identified as Muslim) and children 
who did not identify with any of the characters, in each category where this information 
was available from the questionnaire filled out by the parents. (Note: for the category of 
gender, we compared males’ essentialism scores to females’ scores, as participants 
always identified with one or the other). There were no significant differences between 
the two groups’ of children in any of the categories in U.S. or Turkey, suggesting that 
identification with one of the two characters did not play a role in children’s essentialist 
thinking about the five social categories of interest.  
 Because of the way we presented the stimulus characters to children (in pairs), 
there was also a possibility that children’s answers were influenced by bias towards one 
of the two characters in each pair. For example, if children have discriminatory attitudes 
towards females versus males, but not towards Americans versus British, this difference 
in how they view the different groups in the different categories may lead them to 
essentialize gender strongly and nationality to a weaker degree. To check whether this 
was the case, we compared children’s answers to the question, “do you think A has a lot 
of friends” which was asked about each character in the pair representing a given 
category. In each category, we compared children’s answer to the friends question about 
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character A (e.g., the American) to their answer to the friends question about character B 
(e.g., the British). Children’s responses to these two questions did not differ in any of the 
categories, except SES. In both countries, children were more likely to believe that the 
poor character, compared to the rich character, does not have a lot of friends. 
Interestingly, however, this bias in the category of SES did not lead children to 
essentialize SES to a higher degree than the other categories because SES was one of the 
least essentialized categories across all ages in both countries.  	   To conclude, the relatively similar pattern across two different countries in the 
essentialist beliefs of children and adults about five different social categories adds to the 
literature suggesting that social essentialism is a pervasive, potentially universal bias, 
even if it is also susceptible to considerable cross-cultural and developmental variability. 
Moreover, the particular comparisons examined in this paper reinforce the idea that some 
social categories, like gender and possibly nationality, are especially prone to essentialist 
thinking because of the way that these categories are represented in the human mind. 
Specifically, we conclude that some categories, like gender and nationality are mentally 
represented as biologically relevant categories and not conceived of as pure social 
constructs; this leads to stronger essentialist beliefs about these categories compared to 
other social categories, which are more clearly recognized and represented as arbitrary 





IS MORAL REASONING IN INTER-GROUP CONTEXTS RELATED TO 
SOCIAL ESSENTIALISM?  
 
As discussed earlier, there is a well-established link between an essentialist 
conception of social categories and moral attitudes and judgments in adults. However, 
how this relationship between morality and social essentialism develops remains 
unknown. There is an extensive literature on children’s moral development in an 
intergroup context; however, children’s moral reasoning in intergroup relations has not 
been investigated in terms of their essentialist bias.  
Researchers proposing the social-cognitive domain theory of moral development 
– emphasizing the role of concerns about harm to others in children’s moral development 
– have recently begun to incorporate into their models cultural, contextual, and 
ideological complexities as influential factors of children’s moral reasoning in intergroup 
contexts (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001; Horn, 2003; Killen et al., 2002; see 
Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006 for a comprehensive review of the literature). What 
emerges from this body of work is evidence that children distinguish between extrinsic 
regulations (conventional rules) and intrinsic obligations (moral rules) and believe that 
the former commonly applies to between-group and the latter to within-group 
interactions. Because conventional rule violations are more acceptable than moral rule 
violations, children tend to believe that harms committed against out-group members are 
more acceptable. However, the questions of why and how this happens have not been 
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systematically studied. Using moral transgression scenarios from prior research on 
children’s moral development, we investigate the relation between social essentialism 
and children’s moral judgments for transgressions between members of the same and 
different groups.  
Although not specifically testing the role of essentialism, in Rhodes and Chalik 
(2014), children were presented with two characters from either the same group or two 
different groups described as harming each other, and were asked to judge whether, and 
to what degree, these transgressions are “okay”, or “not okay”. Then, children were 
invited to imagine these characters in a context where there are no rules against harming 
each other, and were asked to rate the transgressions again in this hypothetical situation. 
The results showed that in the absence of rules against harming one another, between-
group harm, but not within-group harm, was viewed as more acceptable. Rhodes and 
Chalik (2014) argue that children reason about between-group obligations (i.e. the 
obligation to avoid harm) as regulated by extrinsic rules, whereas they believe within-
group obligations are governed by intrinsic moral norms. This specific pattern of 
reasoning about obligations to others is presumably a result of social categories marking 
the boundaries of interpersonal obligations. Thus, the more likely children are to conceive 
categories as unchanging, coherent, and stable, the more they should distinguish between 
within-group and between-group cases of moral transgressions, one as rule-based, and the 
other as principle-based.   
A recent study on the causal role of essentialist beliefs in children’s attitudes 
towards members of essentialized novel groups showed no relation between inducing 
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essentialist beliefs about a novel out-group and children’s attitudes towards members of 
the group (Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, & Cimpian, 2017). However, in a 
behavioral resource allocation measure, children did allocate fewer resources to the 
essentialized out-group members compared to a condition where essentialist beliefs were 
not induced. The specific effects of essentialist views on children’s behavior – but not on 
their attitudes – suggest that essentialism plays a limited role in inter-group phenomena.  
One limitation of this prior work is that children may not have strongly 
essentialized views about novel groups they have just encountered.  A stronger test of the 
relationship between essentialist thinking and moral judgments would use real groups, 
which children essentialize to different degrees. Our initial study (Chapter 2) identified a 
clear hierarchy of essentialist views about five social categories, four of which we used as 
stimuli in the current study. 
Using real social categories with known degrees of essentialist thinking among 
children also allowed us to investigate whether other aspects of the social categories give 
rise to moral biases. Namely, moral biases against out-group members may only occur 
when children observe social anomalies (e.g., discrimination) or conflicts for a specific 
social category. Such a connection may manifest itself in two ways.  First, children may 
show moral biases for any real social category, where they are exposed to inter-group 
conflict, regardless of how essentialized the category is; or second, moral biases may 
appear only for those social categories, where intergroup conflict is salient and the 
categories are highly essentialized.  
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We predicted that if the role of social essentialism in intergroup moral reasoning 
is through the biological conception of social categories, then in a highly essentialized 
category, children will judge interactions between members of different groups as 
governed by arbitrary rules (which can be transgressed) and those between members of 
the same group as governed by moral principles (which cannot be transgressed). In 
Chapter 2, we showed a clear rank-ordering in children’s essentialist views about the 
following five social categories: gender, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, and 
sports-team-fan. Focusing on the highest and lowest levels of essentialization, 5-10-year-
old children held strong essentialist beliefs about gender and nationality and relatively 
weaker essentialist beliefs about socioeconomic status (SES) and sports-teams. Thus, if 
essentialism plays a role through presenting categories as biological (i.e. fixed and 
unchanging), we would expect differences in children’s moral judgments about between-
group and within-group transgressions for categories of gender and nationality. 
Specifically, in this case, children should judge between-group transgressions very 
severely if rules are present, but less so in the absence of rules, whereas their judgments 
in within-group scenarios would be independent of rules.  
By contrast, if essentialism plays a more nuanced role in intergroup morality, and 
is moderated by social realities, such as the prevalence of social anomalies (i.e. 
discrimination and competition), then children should judge transgressions as very severe 
in all categories if rules are present, but between-group transgressions less so if rules are 
not operating, in categories where social reality coincides with differential treatment of 
groups. For example, in a society where children are exposed to discrimination between 
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different ethnicities or nationalities, transgressions between different ethnic groups 
should be judged as more rule-contingent and those between members of the same ethnic 
groups as regulated by moral principles. 
In Study 4, using a well-established method for investigating children’s moral 
judgments, we tested these possibilities. Moreover, we included the same measure of 
essentialism used in Studies 1-3 to check for reliability of the results presented in Chapter 
2 and to have an individual measure of essentialism for each child. The sample for this 





 Two hundred and eleven children between 5 and 10 years of age (M = 6.78, SD = 
1.57, 113 females) participated in Study 4. An additional 15 children participated, but 
were excluded due to experimenter error (N = 6), parental intervention (N = 1), difficulty 
concentrating (N = 1), or because they did not complete all procedures (N = 6) or did not 
speak English (N = 1).  
 70% of the parents identified their children as “White – not of Hispanic origin”, 
2.4% as “Black/African American”, 3.3% “Hispanic”, 5.7% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 
2.8% as South Asian/Indian, 9% were identified as mixed-race (“White” and other), 3% 
“Other”, and 1.4% chose not to answer this question. Children were visitors to a local 
science museum in Boston, recruited from a local school or tested in a university lab. 
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Parental education and occupation information suggests that children came from a range 
of middle to upper-middle income backgrounds.  
 In the studies reported in Chapter 2, significant differentiation between categories 
emerged in children’s essentialist beliefs between 5-6-years and 7-8-years of age, with 
only very subtle differences between the 7-8-year olds and 9-10-year olds. Therefore, for 
the current Study, we recruited children in two age groups: 5-6-years and 7-10-years. 
Design 
 Children were tested in a relatively quiet corner of a local museum exhibit, in 
quiet classrooms at a public school, or at a university lab. Parents received a 
questionnaire asking them to identify their child’s gender, ethnicity, religion, and favorite 
baseball team, as well as their own education level, occupation, ethnicity, religion, and 
favorite baseball team.  
 Children were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, corresponding to the 
two highest and the two lowest essentialized categories from Chapter 2 (between 
subjects: Gender, Nationality, SES, and Sports-Teams). Children were first introduced to 
the task and told that they will be shown some pictures of kids doing different things and 
asked some questions about them. Then, depending on the condition the participant was 
assigned to (e.g. SES), the experimenter said that some of the kids shown in the pictures 
will be from one group of the category (e.g. “rich”), and some will be from the other 
group (e.g. “poor”), and then asked the participant to identify herself as belonging to one 
or the other category (e.g. “do you think you are rich or poor?”). After participant 




 All children were presented with six trials, each corresponding to a story about an 
interaction between two characters. All characters were presented using the same generic 
pictures from Chapter 1. All pictures were printed and laminated. A total of fourteen 
characters, gender-matched (except for the Gender condition), and gender-matched with 
the participant were used in pairs for each trial and an additional final task. Characters 
were referred to by letters of the alphabet. They were organized in a random order at the 
beginning of each testing session and presented in a random order, in pairs, for each 
participant. Characters, in all categories, differed from one another only with respect to 
color and style of hair and color of clothes.  
Counterbalancing  
There were three story-types, each focusing on a different kind of moral 
transgression: Physical Harm, Stealing, and Teasing.  For each story-type, there were  
two specific stories describing different variations of the transgression (described below). 
Each participant thus received a total of six stories. Specific stories were crossed with 
story-type and counterbalanced within participants. Three of the stories (one from each 
story-type) always described interactions between two members of the same group – 
Within-Group – (e.g. a rich and another rich character, in the SES condition), and the 
other three described interactions between members of different groups – Between-Group 
–, (e.g. a rich and a poor character, in the SES condition). The three Within and Between 
scenarios were block-randomized within participants, such that children either saw all 
three within stories first or they saw all three between stories first. Order of stories were 
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randomized within each block and specific stories were crossed with the Within and 
Between scenario of a given story-type. Thus, prior to testing, we had created twenty-four 
versions of the coding sheet that differed with respect to block order of Affiliation type 
(Within, Between), order of story-type within each block (Physical Harm, Stealing, 
Teasing), and the specific story used for each story-type in each block (Physical Harm: 
pushing someone off the swing, tripping someone; Stealing: stealing a book, stealing a 
pencil; Teasing: calling someone “fat”, calling someone “stupid”;). Table 9 illustrates 
two of the twenty-four counterbalanced designs. 
 
Participant (Block Order) Affiliation (Order) Story Type Story 
1 (1) Within-Group (1) Psych. Harm 
(2) Stealing 




 (2) Between-Group 
 
 
(1) Psych. Harm 
(2) Stealing 




2 (1) Between-Group (1) Physical Harm 
(2) Stealing 




 (2) Within-Group 
 
(1) Physical Harm 
(2) Stealing 




Table 9. Two sample orders from the twenty-four counterbalanced orders created prior to 




 The experimenter first greeted participants and explained that she will be showing 
them some pictures of “kids who are doing different things” and will then ask some 
questions about what these kids are doing. Then depending on the condition the 
participant was assigned to (e.g. Gender, Nationality, SES, or Teams), the experimenter 
explained that some of the kids in the photos are from one group of the category and 
some are from the other group. For example, to a participant in the Nationality condition, 
the experimenter said, “some of these kids are American, but some are not, they are 
British”. Then, to have a measure of the participants’ personal affiliation with one or the 
other group presented to them, the experiment asked, “are you American?” in the 
Nationality condition, and the relevant identification question in the other conditions 
(Note: in SES, children were asked, “do you think you are rich or poor?”; in Gender, they 
were asked, “are you a boy or a girl?”; and in Teams, they were asked, “are you a Red 
Sox fan?”, if they said no, they were asked “Are you a Yankees fan?”)  In our 
preliminary analysis, children’s self identification did not predict any of our dependent 
measures in any of the four conditions and was thus excluded from the analyses below. 
 On each of the six story trials, the experimenter first introduced the two characters 
and labeled them as belonging to one or the other group of the social category that the 
participant was assigned to. For example, if the participant was assigned to SES, one of 
the two characters in each of the three Between-Group story trials was labeled as “rich” 
and the other as “poor” (e.g. “This is B, and this is G. B is rich, but G is not, she is 
poor”). In the three Within-Group story trials, both characters were labeled as “rich”. The 
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specific groups representing each category were the same ones from Chapter 2 (i.e. male 
and female for Gender, American and British for Nationality, rich and poor for SES, and 
Red Sox and Yankees for Teams). For all four conditions, the Within-group scenarios 
described interactions between members of the advantaged or majority group (i.e. Male 
for Gender, American for Nationality, Rich for SES, and Red Sox for Teams).  
 After labeling the characters, the experimenter then described the interaction 
taking place between the two characters (stealing, psychological harm or physical harm, 
see Script in Appendix C). All stories described one kind of harm and all included a 
transgressor and a victim. In the three Within-Group stories, the transgressor and the 
victim belonged to the same social group, and in the three Between-Group stories, they 
belonged to different groups, with the transgressor always being the character who 
belonged to the majority or socially advantaged group (i.e. Male for Gender, American 
for Nationality, Rich for SES, and Red Sox for Teams) and the victim belonging to the 
other group (i.e. Female for Gender, British for Nationality, Poor for SES, and Yankees 
for Teams).  
 After describing the interaction between the characters in each story, children 
were first asked which character belonged to which group as a comprehension check (e.g. 
“was B rich or poor?” “how about G?”) If children passed the comprehension check, the 
experimenter continued to ask the next question; if they did not, the experimenter 
reminded them of who belonged to which group and then asked the comprehension check 






 Following Rhodes and Chalik (2013), the experimenter then asked the child to 
remember what [the transgressor] did to [the victim], and asked whether it was okay or 
not okay (see Appendix C for Script). If the participant said “not okay”, the experimenter 
then followed up by presenting three blank circles (made from cardboard), increasing in 
size, and asked “was it just not okay, bad, or very bad”, placing the smallest circle first 
(representing “just not okay”), followed by the mid-size (representing “bad”), and the 
largest last (representing “very bad”). In the same manner, if children said “okay” in 
response to the original question, the experimenter followed up by asking “was it just 
okay, good, or very good?”) Thus, the Severity measure ranged from 1-6, with “very 
good” coded as 1, and “very bad” coded as 6.  
 Empathy and Mental States Understanding 
 After the severity question, children were asked two questions about the victim, 
first about how they feel about what happened to the victim, Empathy (e.g. “remember 
what happened to G? How did that make you feel?”), and then about how they think the 
victim herself feels, Mental State Understanding (e.g. “how do you think G herself 
feels?”). For each question, children were presented with a 5-item, Smiley-Face Likert 
scale. The smiley-face scale was first introduced to children before the empathy and 
mental-state understanding questions were asked in the first trial of the study. Children 
were told which face to point to for “very sad”, “a little sad”, “not happy, but also not 
sad”, “a little happy”, and “very happy”, for a range of 1-5, with “very sad” coded as 5 
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and “very happy” coded as 1. After each question, children were asked to justify their 
answer.  
 Severity When No-Rule 
 Immediately after responding to the question about how the victim feels, children 
were asked to imagine the characters living in a place “where there are no rules about [the 
transgression] and the grown-ups say that children could [insert transgression].” Then, 
they were asked whether they think what the transgressor did would then be okay or not 
okay in that place. The same prompts and coding system as in the severity question were 
used.  
 Measure of Individual Variation in Essentialism 
 To control for individual-differences in essentialist beliefs, after the last story 
trial, children were asked the same five essentialism questions from Chapter 2 about two 
new characters (the last pair in the stimuli set) belonging to different groups of the 
relevant category. For example, a child assigned to the SES condition, was introduced 
with two new characters, one labeled as “rich” and the other as “poor”, and then asked all 
five essentialism questions (born, brain, blood, change, environment) about the 




 We expected to replicate results from Chapter 1. Specifically, we expected 
children highly essentialize Gender, followed by Nationality, SES and Teams. Note how 
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Category was a within-subject predictor in studies reported in Chapter 1, whereas it was a 
between-subject predictor in the current study. Thus, replicating the order of 
essentialization without reference to the other social categories would provide a strong 
test of that result. 
Severity 
 Although we did not have a specific prediction for children’s initial severity 
ratings, we expected them to rate within-group and between-group transgressions to the 
same degree, in highly essentialized (i.e. Gender and Nationality), and in the less 
essentialized categories (Teams and SES). We expected this pattern because in prior 
studies, the initial severity ratings did not produce much variation between groups. 
Understanding normative standards against harm, children would likely indicate that all 
transgressions are fairly “bad”, regardless of group affiliations. However, this measure 
provides an anchor for the changes in response compared to the Severity-When-No-Rule 
ratings. 
Severity-When-No-Rule 
  When asked to imagine the same transgressions taking place in a world where 
there are no rules against the transgression and the “grownups say it is okay for children” 
to engage in the specific transgression, we predicted a difference between children’s 
ratings of within-group and between-group transgressions, in the highly essentialized 
categories (e.g. Gender and Nationality), but not in the least essentialized categories (e.g. 
Teams and SES).  This expectation was based on prior work suggesting that children 
assume moral obligations between members of different groups (in-group, out-group) to 
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be rule contingent, whereas they recognize an inherent value in obligations between 
members of the same social groups (in-group, in-group). We predicted that in the highly 
essentialized social categories, children would be more likely to assume that interactions 
are regulated by rules, rather than inherent moral values. However, if specific experiences 
with a social category moderate a link between essentialism and intergroup morality, we 
would expect that children will not view between-group transgressions as rule-contingent 
in all highly essentialized categories, but only in those categories where children have 
been exposed to social anomalies (e.g. differential treatment of immigrants). 
Change in Severity Ratings from Rule to No-Rule Scenarios 
 Consistent with the predictions above, and based on Rhodes & Chalik’s (2014) 
findings, we expected a significantly higher rate of change from children’s initial severity 
ratings to their severity-when-no-rule ratings for between-group, compared to within-
group, transgressions, in the highly essentialized categories (e.g. Gender and Nationality). 
 
Results 
 We analyzed all data and conducted all statistics using SPSS, version 20 (IBM 
SPSS Advanced Statistics 20.0, IBM Corporations). 
 
Are the results from Chapter 2 on the pattern of essentialization of different social 
categories replicated?  
 Recall that in Chapter 2, we found a decreasing rank-order in children’s 
essentialist beliefs about the categories of Gender, Nationality, Religion, SES, and 
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Teams. In the current study, we asked children the same essentialism questions about 
four of these categories (e.g. Gender, Nationality, SES, and Teams), in a between-subject 
design. Before continuing with our analysis on the role of essentialist beliefs in children’s 
moral reasoning, we first investigated the pattern of children’s essentialist beliefs about 
these categories. To do this, we conducted linear regression models on children’s total 
essentialism scores (composite of the same five questions from Chapter 2: born, brain, 
blood, change, and environment). We included Age Group and Category as within-
subject predictors. In another model, we also included the Age Group x Category 
interaction term, but dropped it in the final model since it was not significant and did not 
improve the fit of the model. In the final model, there was a main effect of Age Group (β 
(SE) = -0.26 (0.12), t(189) = -2.08, p = 0.04), and a main effect of Category (see Table 10 
for coefficients). As suggested by this analysis and illustrated in Figure 5, children’s 
essentialist beliefs about these categories, in a between-subject design, replicates the 
same rank-order observed in Chapter 2. Overall, children’s social essentialist beliefs 
slightly decrease with Age but for all ages tested, Gender is the most highly essentialized, 
followed by Nationality. The difference between these two categories becomes 
significant for the 7-10 year olds. At all ages tested, essentialist beliefs about SES and 
Teams are significantly lower compared to Gender and Nationality, but not different from 
each other. In summary, these results closely mirror the variation in degree of 










* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 # Reference level in the comparison. 
 
Table 10. Parameters for models comparing all levels of Category. 
 
Do children evaluate transgressions between members of different groups as equally 
“bad” in familiar contexts, where rules against transgressions presumably apply?   
 The results on children’s essentialization patterns suggest that we can proceed 
with our question about the degree of children’s essentialist beliefs influencing their 






































Comparisons All Ages 
 B (SE) 
Gender (#) – Nationality     -0.42 (0.18)* 
Gender (#) – SES      -1.25 (0.18)*** 
Gender (#) – Teams       -1.35 (0.18)*** 
Nationality (#) – SES      -0.84 (0.17)*** 
Nationality (#) – Teams       -0.93 (0.20)*** 
Teams (#) – SES  0.10 (0.17) 
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  Recall that we expected that in familiar contexts, children will reason about the 
obligation to avoid harm similarly when judging interactions between people from 
different groups or those between people from the same group, regardless of their social 
essentialist beliefs.  
 To test this prediction, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA on 
children’s Severity ratings in each Category, with Age Group (2 levels: Younger, Older) 
as a between-subject factor, and Affiliation (2 levels: Between-group, Within-group), and 
Story-Type (3 levels: Physical Harm, Stealing, Teasing) as repeated measures. Figure 6 
shows children’s severity ratings for each category by Affiliation and Story-Type, 
collapsed across Age Groups, since Age Group was not a significant predictor for 





Figure 7. Children’s severity ratings by Category and Story-Type.  
 
 In the category of Gender, there was a main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: 
M = 5.29 (0.11), Between-Group: M = 5.55 (0.08), F (1, 40) = 7.71, p < 0.01, ηp²  = 0.16), 
a main effect of Story-Type (Physical Harm: M = 5.53 (0.09), Stealing: M = 5.28 (0.10), 
Teasing: M = 5.44 (0.16), F (2, 80) = 3.59, p = 0.03, ηp²  = 0.08), no main effect of Age 
Group (Younger: M = 5.34 (0.12), Older: M = 5.48 (0.20), F (1, 40) = 0.67, p = 0.42), 
and no significant interactions. Pairwise comparisons indicated that Physical Harm is 
rated as significantly worse compared to Stealing (M difference = 0.25 (0.10), p = 0.01, CI 
[0.05 – 0.44]), with Stealing and Teasing rated similarly (p = 0.14).  
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 Notice that the pattern of children’s severity ratings in Gender was different from 
our expectation. Children believed that between-group transgressions are “worse” 
compared to within-group transgressions when interactions take place between two 
people of different genders. Note, however that in the Gender condition, the transgressor 
was always a male and the victim was a female in the between-group trials and another 
male in the within-group trials. Thus, the specific gender dynamics of the between-group 
stories (i.e. a male harming a female) may have contributed uniquely to children’s 
reasoning in this condition. Thus, children believe it is worse for a “boy” to harm a “girl” 
than it is for a “boy” to harm a “boy”.  Since participants’ own gender could also play a 
role in children’s reasoning in the category of Gender, we checked for the effect of 
participant gender on this difference in children’s severity ratings between the in-group 
and out-group scenarios. To do this, we added Participant-Gender to the ANOVA from 
above in the Gender category and observed no main effect of Gender, but a significant 
Affiliation x Story Type x Participant-Gender term. Follow-up, simple effects tests 
showed that for females, a boy teasing a girl is worse than a boy teasing another boy 
(Between-Group (boy-girl): M = 5.63 (0.17), Within-Group (boy-boy): M = 4.88 (0.22), 
M difference = 0.75, p < 0.01, CI [0.26 – 1.24]), whereas for males, a boy stealing from a girl 
is worse than a boy stealing from another boy (Between-Group (boy-girl): M = 5.61 
(0.15), Within-Group (boy-boy): M = 4.99 (0.23), M difference = 0.62, p = 0.02, CI [0.28 – 





Figure 8. Children’s severity ratings, in the Gender category, by Affiliation and 
participants’ gender, for each Story Type. Teasing and Stealing show interaction patterns.  
 
 In the category of Nationality, there was a main effect of Story-Type (Physical 
Harm: M = 5.53 (0.09), Stealing: M = 5.28 (0.10), Teasing: M = 5.44, F (2, 92) = 9.68, p 
< 0.001, ηp²  = 0.17), no main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 5.18 (0.09), 
Between-Group: M = 5.24 (0.08), F (1, 46) = 0.74, p = 0.39), no main effect of Age 
Group (Younger: M = 5.15 (0.10), Older: M = 5.28 (0.10), F (1, 46) = 0.80, p = 0.38), 
and no significant interaction terms. Comparisons of different levels of Story Type 
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showed that Physical Harm was rated differently from both Stealing (M difference = 0.23 
(0.08), p < 0.01, CI [0.08 – 0.38]), and Teasing (M difference = 0.35 (0.09), p < 0.001, CI 
[0.17 – 0.54], with no difference between Stealing and Teasing. 
 For the category of SES, there was no main effect of Story-Type (Physical Harm: 
M = 5.50 (0.09), Stealing: M = 5.33 (0.10), Teasing: M = 5.28 (0.09), F (2, 98) = 2,48, p 
= 0.09), no main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 5.31 (0.09), Between-Group: 
M = 5.43 (0.08), F (1, 49) = 1.76, p = 0.19), no main effect of Age Group (Younger: M = 
5.39 (0.10), Older: M = 5.35 (0.10), F (1, 49) = 0.09, p = 0.76), and no significant 
interaction terms.  
  For the category of Teams, there was no significant main effect of Story-Type 
(Physical Harm: M = 5.55 (0.08), Stealing: M = 5.37 (0.09), Teasing: M = 5.45 (0.07), F 
(2, 96) = 2.08, p = 0.16), no main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 5.47 (0.08), 
Between-Group: M = 5.45 (0.06), F (1, 48) = 0.10, p = 0.76), no main effect of Age 
Group (Younger: M = 5.54 (0.08), Older: M = 5.38 (0.08), F (1, 48) = 2.08, p = 0.16) and 
no significant interaction terms.   
 In sum, children’s severity ratings in familiar contexts, where rules against moral 
transgressions presumably apply, are not sensitive to group affiliations, unless the 
dynamics of the scenarios trigger specific social etiquette norms (e.g. “boys should be 





In a hypothetical world where rules don’t apply, do children evaluate transgressions 
between members of different groups of a highly essentialized social category – as 
opposed to those between members of the same group – less severely?   
 Recall that for each story that children heard, after they rated the transgression, 
they were asked to imagine a world with no rules against the specific transgression and 
where “the grownups said it’s okay for children” to engage in the transgression. Children 
were then asked to rate the transgression one more time, under this hypothetical 
condition.  
 To test the link between essentialism and inter-group bias in children’s reasoning 
about transgressions when told rules do not apply, we ran similar ANOVA models as in 
the previous section, on children’s severity-when-no-rule ratings. Thus, for each 
category, we ran a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA, with Age Group as a between-
subject predictor, and Story-Type and Affiliation as repeated measures.  
 For the category of Gender, we found a significant main effect of Age Group 
(Younger: M = 4.66 (0.34), Older: M = 3.70 (0.31), F (1, 38) = 4.44, p = 0.04). Older 
children, overall, rated the transgressions less severely, compared to the younger 
children. Moreover, there was no significant main effect of Story-Type (Physical Harm: 
M = 4.10 (0.24), Stealing: M = 4.18 (0.25), Teasing: M = 4.26 (0.24), F (2, 76) = 0.54, p 
= 0.59), no main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 4.09 (0.24), Between-Group: 
M = 4.27 (0.23), F (1, 38) = 1.83, p = 0.18) and no interaction effects. This is interesting 
in light of children’s differential ratings for Gender under normal circumstances, where 
children rated transgressions committed by a male against a female as “worse” compared 
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to those committed by a male against another male; when presented with the same 
scenarios but in a hypothetical world with no rules, children do not differentiate between 
the scenarios any longer, suggesting a sensitivity to the rules and norms regulating social 
interactions. 
 In the category of Nationality, there was a main effect of Story-Type (Physical 
Harm: M = 4.29 (0.19), Stealing: M = 4.11 (0.22), Teasing: M = 3.99 (0.19), F (2, 94) = 
4.30, p = 0.02, ηp²  = 0.08), and a significant Affiliation x Story-Type interaction term (F 
(2, 94) =4.43, p = 0.01, ηp²  = 0.09). We followed up the analysis with Post-hoc tests on 
Story-Type: Physical Harm was rated differently compared to Teasing (M difference = 0.30 
(0.09), p < 0.01, CI [0.11 – 0.50]), but not compared to Stealing. Stealing and Teasing 
were also rated similarly. Follow-up, simple effects tests on the Affiliation x Story-Type 
interaction effect showed that in scenarios depicting physical harm, children rate within-
group transgressions more severely compared to between-group transgressions (M difference 
= 0.31 (0.15), p = 0.04, CI [0.01 – 0.60], see Figure 8, upper right panel). We found no 
main effect of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 4.17 (0.20), Between-Group: M = 4.08 
(0.19), F (1, 47) = 1.16, p = 0.29), Age Group (Younger: M = 3.97 (0.27), Older: M = 
4.29 (0.27), F (1, 47) = 0.67, p = 0.42) or any other significant interaction terms.  
 In the category of SES, we found no significant main effects of Story-Type 
(Physical Harm: M = 4.41 (0.22), Stealing: M = 4.43 (0.21), Teasing: M = 4.42 (0.22), F 
(2, 92) = 0.03, p = 0.97) Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 4.40 (0.21), Between-Group: M 
= 4.43 (0.21), F (1, 46) = 0.13, p = 0.72), or Age Group (Younger: M = 4.43 (0.30), 
Older: M = 4.41 (0.29), F (1, 46) = 0.00, p = 0.96), and no significant interaction terms.  
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 In the category of Teams, we found a marginal difference of Story-Type (F (2, 
96) = 3.19, p = 0.05, ηp²  = 0.06), with Physical Harm rated differently compared to 
Stealing (M difference = 0.23 (0.10), p = 0.03, CI [0.03 – 0.43]). We found no significant 
main effects of Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 4.21 (0.23), Between-Group: M = 4.15 
(0.23), F (1, 48) = 0.67, p = 0.41), or Age Group (Younger: M = 4.29 (0.32), Older: M = 
4.07 (0.32), F (1, 48) = 0.24, p = 0.63), and no significant interaction terms.  
 
 




Are children’s severity judgments overall different when they assume normal 
circumstances compared to when they assume no rules?  
 Recall that, based on prior research (Rhodes & Chalik, 2014), we predicted a 
larger drop in children’s severity ratings, under the hypothetical no-rule situation, for 
between-group compared to within-group transgressions, especially in the highly 
essentialized categories. Before proceeding to test this hypothesis, however, we asked if 
children’s ratings in the hypothetical no-rule situation are significantly different from 
their original ratings at all. Conducting a paired-samples t-test on children’s severity 
ratings before and after the information about rules, we found that compared to their 
original ratings, children’s severity ratings were significantly lower after they were asked 
to rate the transgressions in a hypothetical world with no rules (Before-Rule: M = 32.19 
(2.99), After-Rule: M = 25.29 (8.69), t (189) = -10.95, p < 0.001). As suggested by the 
literature on children’s moral development, the difference in children’s severity ratings 
suggests that overall children tend to evaluate transgressions as rule-contingent behavior. 
However, we were interested in whether the degree to which children view transgressions 
as contingent on explicit rules changes with other factors, and importantly based on the 
group affiliations of the transgressor and the victim, depending on social category. 
Moreover, previous literature shows this effect to decrease with age. Therefore, in the 
following analysis, we tested for the effect of Age Group, Affiliation, and Story-Type, as 
well as all interactions, on the difference between children’s severity judgments before 




Does the drop in children’s severity ratings under the hypothetical no-rule situation 
depend on group affiliation in the highly essentialized categories? 
 Similar to the analyses in the previous sections, to investigate whether the drop in 
children’s severity ratings is larger in between-group compared to within-group 
scenarios, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA on children’s change score in each 
category. 
 In the category of Gender, there were no main effects of Story-Type (Physical 
Harm: M = 1.46 (0.23), Stealing: M = 1.09 (0.22), Teasing: M = 1.20 (0.25), F (2, 76) = 
2.07, p = 0.13), or Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 1.24 (0.23), Between-Group: M = 1.26 
(0.22), F (1, 38) = 0.03, p = 0.86), and no significant interaction terms. However, there 
was a main effect of Age Group (Younger: M = 0.71(0.31), Older: M = 1.79 (0.28), F (1, 
38) = 6.56, p = 0.01, ηp²  = 0.15), on children’s change scores. Older children’s severity 
ratings dropped more substantially compared to younger children’s ratings. The pattern 
observed here is inconsistent with prior work showing that already by age 4, children are 
more likely to recognize moral transgressions as strictly moral and differentiate them 
from conventional ones (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). However, recall that in the current 
study, for the category of Gender, there were specific gender-dynamics which children 
may recognize as normative (i.e. “boys should be nice to girls”). Thus, older children 
may be recognizing this normativity and responding to it accordingly, as suggested by the 
drop in their ratings when rules are not a consideration. Moreover, the normative gender 
dynamics make it also likely that different genders respond differently, as observed in 
children’s severity ratings. Therefore, we ran a second ANOVA in the category of 
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Gender, on children’s change scores, including Gender, in addition to the other factors. 
Similar to the findings on children’s severity ratings, here again, there was a significant 
Affiliation x Story-Type x Participant-Gender interaction effect (F (2, 72) = 4.40, p = 
0.02, ηp²  = 0.11) . Simple effects analyses revealed that the drop in females’ severity 
ratings for between-group, teasing scenarios (a boy teasing a girl) was higher than the 
drop in their ratings of within-group, teasing scenarios (a boy teasing another boy) (M 
difference = 0.91 (0.43), p = 0.04, CI [0.04 – 1.79]). Figure 9 (left panel) shows this pattern.  
 In the category of Nationality, we found no significant main effects of Story-Type 
(Physical Harm: M = 1.06 (0.20), Stealing: M = 1.03 (0.24), Teasing: M = 1.03 (0.23), F 
(2, 92) = 0.05, p = 0.95), Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 0.97 (0.23), Between-Group: M 
= 1.11 (0.21), F (1, 46) = 1.56, p = 0.22), or Age Group (Younger: M = 1.17 (0.30), 
Older: M = 0.90 (0.30), F (1, 46) = 0.39, p = 0.54), and no significant interaction terms.  
 For the category of SES, there were no significant main effects of Story-Type 
(Physical Harm: M = 1.10 (0.22), Stealing: M = 0.90 (0.21), Teasing: M = 0.86 (0.22), F 
(2, 92) = 2.06, p = 0.13), Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 0.90 (0.22), Between-Group: M 
= 1.00 (0.21), F (1, 46) = 0.83, p = 0.37), or Age Group (Younger: M = 0.95 (0.30), 
Older: M = 0.96 (0.29), F (1, 46) = 0.00, p = 0.97), and no significant interaction terms. 
 Likewise, in the category of Teams, there were no main effects of Story-Type 
(Physical Harm: M = 1.29 (0.23), Stealing: M = 1.37 (0.25), Teasing: M = 1.25 (0.23), F 
(2, 94) = 0.43, p = 0.65), Affiliation (Within-Group: M = 1.28 (0.23), Between-Group: M 
= 1.33 (0.23), F (1, 47) = 0.38, p = 0.54), or Age Group (Younger: M = 1.30 (0.32), 




 Figure 10. The change in children’s severity ratings from rule to no-rule situations in the 
Gender category, by Affiliation and participants’ gender, for each Story Type. Teasing 
shows an interaction pattern. The patterns in Stealing are not significant.  
 
Individual Measures of Essentialism  
 Recall that after all six transgression story trials, every child participated in a last 
trial, where she rated two new characters from different groups of the category they were 
assigned to on the five essentialism questions from Chapter 2. To analyze possible effects 
on essentialist beliefs as an individual measure on children’s ratings on severity, severity-
when- no-rule, and the change score, we conducted mixed effects regression models on 
each dependent measure (Severity, Severity-when-no-rule, Change Sore) separately, each 
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with Age Group as a between-subject factor, Total Essentialism as a between-subject, 
continuous predictor, and Story-Type and Affiliation as within-subject factors. We 
collapsed across Category for this analysis. Total essentialism was not a significant 
predictor of Severity, Severity-after-rule, or the Change Score.  
 We also conducted models on each dependent variable with the individual 
dimensions of essentialism as the predictors, to check for possible effects of the 
biological (e.g. brain, blood, born) or the non-biological (e.g. change and environment) 
aspects of essentialist reasoning on children’s patterns of moral reasoning. None of the 
dimensions of essentialist reasoning predicted a difference in children’s severity in the 
cases of between-group, as opposed to within-group, interactions.  
 However, children’s essentialization scores in terms of brain differences between 
people significantly interacted with Age Group in their Severity-After-Rule Ratings (B = 
0.53 (0.24), t (190) = 2.24, p < 0.05). Following up on the interaction with linear 
regression plots and simple effects showed that younger children, when asked to imagine 
a world with no rules, rated the transgressions less severely if they had higher 
essentialization scores in the brain question (B = -0.38 (0.18), t (93) = -2.09, p < 0.05). 
Thus, for younger children, the more likely they were to believe that people from 
different groups have different “brains”, the less likely they were to continue rating 
transgressions between people as “very bad” when rules do not apply. This effect was 
attenuated for cases of physical harm compared to stealing (B = 0.25 (0.12), t (370) = 
2.01, p < 0.05) and compared to teasing (B = 0.30 (0.12), t (370) = 2.48, p < 0.05). 
 Interestingly, younger children also showed a difference in their severity-when-
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no-rule ratings with affiliation (B = -0.96 (0.40), t (93) = -2.41, p < 0.05), controlling for 
their essentialist reasoning in terms of the effects of the environment on social group 
membership, and specifically, rated between-group transgressions less severely when 
rules did not apply. However, a significant interaction was found also between 
Affiliation, Story Type and essentialist reasoning in terms of the effects of the 
environment (Essentialization-Environment) (B = -0.40 (0.19), t (370) = -2.14, p < 0.05 – 
comparing Stealing to Physical Harm; B = -0.61 (0.19), t (370) = -3.24, p < 0.01 – 
comparing Teasing to Physical Harm). Following up on this interaction showed that for 
transgressions between members of different groups, the degree of essentialist beliefs (in 
terms of effects of the environment) predicts children’s ratings in the cases of stealing 
and teasing more strongly compared to cases of physical harm.  
 The change in children’s original severity ratings to their ratings in the no-rule 
scenario was not influenced by any of the individual dimensions of essentialist thinking. 
 The patterns observed above are not systematic and cannot be interpreted in a 
straightforward manner; however, they have an important implication about what 
dimension of social essentialism, if any, can possibly influence children’s moral 
reasoning. Namely, in addition to studying the role of essentialism in children’s 
intergroup moral reasoning as a direct or an indirect link, teasing apart different 
dimensions of essentialist thinking as more biological or social is also critical to 





Empathy with, and understanding the mental state of, the victim   
 We had included measures of empathy with the victim and mental-state 
understanding of the victim as possible mediators for a difference in children’s judgments 
in between- compared to within-group transgressions in the highly essentialized 
categories. Since we did not observe any systematic patterns in children’s judgments, we 
did not follow up any of the analyses above with the addition of empathy and mental-
state-understanding as predictors. However, we did break down children’s scores on 
these two measures by Category, Affiliation, and Story-Type to check for differences in 
children’s empathy and mental-state understanding with affiliation-type. The two 
measures were highly correlated in all categories and there were no significant 
differences in the within- and between-group scenarios on children’s empathy with the 
victim or their understanding of how the victim feels. Children’s ratings on both 
measures were at ceiling, with mean values between 4.50 and 5.00 for both within group 
and between group stories, for each type of transgression and in all categories. Age was 
not a significant predictor of either measure.  
 
Discussion 
 We replicated results on children’s essentialist views about gender, nationality, 
SES, and sports-teams from prior work, presented in Chapter 2. Despite finding a clear 
rank-ordering in children’s social essentialist views about these categories, however, we 
did not find systematic effects of social essentialism on children’s inter-group moral 
judgments. However, we did find one specific pattern in children’s moral judgments in 
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the category of nationality that partially supports our predictions. When asked to imagine 
a world with no rules against the presented transgressions, children judged scenarios 
depicting an American physically hurting (e.g. pushing off a swing, tripping) a British as 
less “bad” compared to those depicting an American hurting another American. 
Interestingly, physical harm was consistently judged by children as the worst kind of 
transgression, but in the absence of rules regulating interactions involving physical harm, 
children judged within-group harm more severely, compared to between-group harm. 
This was not the case, however, when children judged the scenarios under the assumption 
that rules are in place, suggesting a sensitivity to extrinsic rules in children’s between-
group judgments in a highly essentialized category (i.e. nationality).  
 Children’s judgments about severity of transgressions in cases where rules were 
assumed followed an interesting pattern in the category of gender, another category about 
which children are shown to have consistently high essentialist beliefs. Specifically, 
overall, children rated transgressions committed by a boy against a girl more severely 
compared to those between two boys. This was especially true for female participants 
when they heard about a boy teasing a girl, and for male participants when they heard 
about a boy stealing from a girl. Children’s differential moral judgments of the within- 
versus between-group transgressions in the category of gender, however, did not hold 
when children were asked to imagine a world with no rules against the transgressions. 
Although this is not the pattern we specifically predicted, it is consistent with the idea 
that children may judge cases of moral transgressions between members of different 
groups based on extrinsic social rules. Perhaps children’s high severity ratings of cases 
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where a boy hurts a girl reflects an overemphasis on rules about gender dynamics, which 
they may have learned from parents or teachers. Moreover, this pattern of judging boy-
girl transgressions differently from boy-boy ones changes with participants’ own gender, 
further supporting the idea that children are sensitive to the specific rule they learn about 
in different contexts. Presumably, young boys and girls are familiarized with different 
rules governing interactions between the two genders: specifically, among Western, 
educated and modern families striving for gender equality, girls may be taught early on 
that it is unacceptable for a member of the opposite gender to mock their intelligence or 
physical appearance, which are the two examples of “teasing” scenarios presented in our 
study. Thus, we see high severity ratings among girls on the teasing scenarios when a boy 
is portrayed as teasing a girl.   
 Interestingly, although there was an overall drop when comparing children’s 
original ratings with their ratings in the no-rule scenarios, girls’ ratings of the boy-girl, 
teasing scenarios dropped more dramatically. That is to say that the specific scenario that 
was judged as exceptionally “bad” by girls under the assumption that rules are in place, 
dropped dramatically in how “bad” girls considered it to be under the assumption that 
rules do not apply. Again, this specific pattern supports the hypothesis that children are 
sensitive to social norms and context-specific rules in their moral reasoning.  
 Notice that despite what we found about the origins of social essentialism in 
Chapter 2, our findings in this chapter suggest that the role of social essentialism in inter-
group moral reasoning is limited and perhaps context-specific. More importantly, our 
findings suggest that essentialism alone does not lead to differential moral reasoning in 
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inter-group contexts, but only when accompanied by other social and cultural 
phenomena. For example, if within a specific social structure, differences between “us” 
and “others” are emphasized and made salient to children through different transfer 
processes,  essentialism can lead to a cognitive “naturalization” of these differences and 
thus contribute to differential moral treatment of the out-group. Specifically, the pattern 
observed in our data shows that for the most serious kind of transgressions, as judged by 
children, harm imposed by an American to an “outsider” (i.e. A British person) is not 
judged to be as “bad” as harm imposed by an American to another American. It is 
important to stress that we are not arguing that the social emphasis on “differences” 
between “us” and “them”, must be directed towards the specific groups children come see 
as relevant “outsiders” (there is no specific discrimination against British people in 
contemporary American society), but that through social emphasis on being “American”, 
children come to learn that being from a different country warrants a more lenient moral 
stance. Future work should focus on testing this proposal in different cultural contexts 
where children are exposed to different kinds of social discrimination (i.e. based on 
religious affiliation or social class, where the discriminatory treatment is salient to 
children).  
 In line with our results, Rhodes et al., (2017) did not find an effect of essentialist 
reasoning on children’s preferences and attitudes in a group paradigm. There are several 
important differences and points of convergence between our study and Rhodes et al., 
2017. Specifically, in Rhodes et al., (2017), children were familiarized with an 
experimental, novel, out-group; in one condition, essentialist views were induced about 
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the novel out-group and in the other condition, essentialist views were not induced. 
Children’s attitudes were then measured about the out-group. Children also had an 
opportunity to share with the out-group members. The results show that children’s 
attitudes towards the out-group were not different in the two conditions and although in 
the essentialism condition, children did actually hold stronger essentialist beliefs about 
the out-group, they did not have more negative attitudes towards the out-group, compared 
to the control condition. However, children’s giving behavior was different in the 
essentialism and the control conditions. Children in the essentialism condition gave fewer 
resources to the essentialized out-group, compared to the number of resources children 
gave to the out-group in the control condition.  
The lack of a direct, causal role of essentialism in children’s intergroup attitudes 
and social preferences, despite a direct role in their decision to share resources suggests 
that different mechanisms or reasoning processes can be influenced by essentialist beliefs 
in various ways. Specifically, Rhodes et al., (2017) argue that essentialism may signal 
category boundaries to children, thereby affecting their expectations about social 
reciprocity. This can, in turn, influence children’s decisions in a giving task, but not 
necessarily their attitudes towards groups.  
Given this line of reasoning, in Study 4, we investigated the role of essentialist 
beliefs in yet another domain, namely the domain of moral reasoning. It is also important 
to note here that in our study children did not judge out-group as opposed to in-group 
members, but they judged interactions between third-parties, without necessarily 
identifying with one or the other of the characters. In fact, children’s affiliation with the 
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group of one or the other of the characters, as reported by their parents (e.g. American 
versus not American) did not affect the patterns of the results. Thus, using scenarios were 
children pass on moral judgments about interactions between third parties, we show that 
children’s judgments about within-group and between-group interactions are affected by 
essentialist reasoning only when group differences are socially salient or particularly 
emphasized. Consistent with this interpretation, Mandalaywala, Rhodes, & Amodio 
(under review) found that the link between essentialist beliefs about race and racial 
prejudice is mediated by attitudes towards the status quo. Thus, although essentialism is 
linked with out-group stereotyping, dehumanization, and prejudice in children and adults 
(see Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Pauker, Ambady, & 
Apfelbaum, 2010), it does not necessarily affect children’s moral reasoning about 
interactions between groups, especially when their own group affiliations are not 
emphasized. If essentialism primarily signals objective, discrete, and inflexible category 
boundaries, perhaps it only directly influences people’s attitudes and interactions with 
those outside the boundaries of one’s own groups (Williams, & Eberhardt, 2008); 
Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013; Bernstain, Sacco, Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 
2010; No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood, & Chao, 2008), but does not directly influence the 
way one reasons about interactions between groups in a more abstract sense, unless 
reinforced by social hierarchies, group discrimination, or power dynamics. Our results 
support this account and provide a starting point for systematically studying the link, as 
well as the causal directionality, between social essentialist beliefs, various dimensions of 





CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 We presented a comprehensive research project on possible links between social 
essentialism and moral development in inter-group contexts. Overall, the results 
presented here suggest that there is no straightforward causal or correlational link 
between social essentialism and group biases in moral reasoning among 5-10-year-old 
children, although some patterns in children’s reasoning suggest indirect links. Below, a 
summary of each chapter and implications of the presented work will be briefly 
discussed.  
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we presented results on the developmental 
patterns of social essentialism across two very different cultures, Turkey and the US. 
There were striking similarities between the two countries on the specific categories that 
were essentialized strongly and those that were essentialized to weaker degrees. One 
interesting emerging pattern was that the categories of gender and nationality were both 
essentialized early on during development and remained to be the most highly 
essentialized categories throughout development, in both countries. Another interesting 
pattern was a decline in essentialist beliefs about religion among adults from both 
countries.  
 Recall the two major theories of social essentialism discussed earlier, one defining 
essentialism as a cognitive construal specific to the domain of biology, and the other 
defining essentialism as a mode of thinking that extends across different domains, 
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including the social domain. A strong version of the former theory would predict that 
only strictly biological categories be prone to an essentialist psychology, which, as shown 
by decades of research on essentialism among children and adults in different societies, 
does not hold true. A weaker version of this theory, however, would predict that any 
category cognitively construed as biological should be essentialized. Our results partially 
support this prediction; however, we also show that psychological essentialism is not a 
categorical concept where something is either essentialized or it is not. Rather, 
psychological essentialism comes in degrees, and specifically in the social domain, there 
are some categories that are highly essentialized and some that are essentialized to 
weaker degrees. Given the continuous nature of psychological essentialism, an important 
question is why some categories are strongly essentialized and some weakly. On the 
biological model, a possible mechanism is that social categories are essentialized to the 
degree that they are construed as biological. Our results in Chapter 2 are consistent with 
this proposal. 
 The domain-general model, on the other hand, posits that specific requirements 
have to be met for a social category to be essentialized. One such requirement is the 
presence of cognitive anomalies that presumably have stemmed from social imbalances, 
tensions, or conflicts involving different groups of a social category. On this account, 
when a specific cognitive anomaly arises due to, for example, differential social status of 
males and females witnessed in social interactions, a strong essentialist mode of thinking 
is triggered by the presence of the anomaly in order to “naturalize” reality and explain 
away the anomaly. Although this model is a very useful tool for understanding the link 
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between essentialism and social realities such as discrimination, unbalanced power 
dynamics, and structural group oppression, our results are, mostly inconsistent with this 
idea. Recall that both gender and nationality were highly essentialized in both countries 
among children and adults, and religion less so. However, if essentialist psychology 
mainly arises in the presence of anomalies caused by differential treatment of or attitudes 
towards groups, then it should manifest differently in different cultures where the group 
dynamics and social realities are not the same. This was not the case in our data, 
however. For example, British and American citizens are not really in conflict today and 
thus children would not likely witness anomalous interactions between these 
nationalities. Nevertheless, one could argue that both gender and nationality are 
categories where different forms of discrimination against minority or “other” group (e.g. 
females in the case of gender, and “outsiders” in the case of nationality) take place in 
both countries where we collected data. Although this is true, based on the “anomaly” 
model, slight variation would still be expected in the patterns of essentialism about the 
five categories tested (gender, nationality, religion, SES, and teams), relative to one 
another, across the countries.  
 In sum, although we emphasize the role of a biological construal of social 
categories in the degree of psychological essentialism, future work should perhaps focus 
on cross-cultural comparisons where cultures differ drastically in the prevalence of social 
and structural conflict between groups of given categories; such comparisons would help 
present more clear results on the contribution of each model discussed here to the 
understanding of social essentialism. Future work should also focus on teasing apart 
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specific dimensions of essentialist thinking in the social domain. In our data, we did not 
observe a systematic pattern in children’s essentialist beliefs about the social categories 
we tested in terms of the various dimensions. Specifically, when looking at the more 
biologically relevant dimensions (i.e. blood, brain, birth), versus the stability/change and 
effects of the environment dimensions, there were no systematic differences between the 
categories of gender, nationality, religion, SES, and sports-team fans. However, the two 
highly essentialized categories, gender and nationality, were essentialized differently 
from all other categories in terms of how people are born, by the younger children, with 
essentialist beliefs about the other dimensions uniquely emerging for these categories 
with age. More importantly, the rank-order in children’s essentialist beliefs about the 
categories was roughly preserved regardless of which dimension of essentialism we 
looked at. Although these dimensions do not necessarily correlate, our results suggest that 
social categories that are highly essentialized by all ages (e.g. gender and nationality) are 
essentialized in terms of all five dimensions we observed. Future work, however, should 
investigate the developmental pattern of other dimensions of essentialist thinking, such as 
inductive potential and objectivity of category boundaries, in relation to the biological 
dimensions.     
 In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, we presented results on the question of whether 
social essentialism in children is linked to group biases in the moral domain. The results 
did not show a clear link, although they suggest a partial role of social essentialism in 
inter-group moral biases, complemented with more complex social realities transmitted to 
children. Here, the model of essentialism that emphasizes the role of anomalies can be 
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useful in explaining our observations of the indirect link between essentialism and inter-
group morality. Presumably, if social conflict or tension between groups of a given 
category (e.g. nationality) is already salient and prevalent in a society, psychological 
essentialism can provide a way to cognitively “make sense” of the existing social reality. 
This process of sense-making, in turn, can lead to the view that only conventional rules, 
rather than moral principles, apply to interactions between the groups in conflict or 
tension, as our data show. It is important to note that the distinction we are drawing here 
between children’s conception of conventional rules versus moral principles does not 
cohere with the same distinction emphasized by the social-domain theory of moral 
development (see Smetana, 2006, 2013). Surprisingly, our data suggest that children in 
our sample conceive of the transgressions defined classically as moral transgressions by 
the social-domain theory – not regulated by social and conventional rules, but by moral 
principles – as somewhat conventional. We presented children with examples of 
interactions judged by children from previous research on social-domain theory as moral 
transgressions (e.g. stealing, physical harm, teasing). Importantly, these transgressions 
are defined as moral because in previous work, children’s severity judgments for these 
did not drop when a hypothetical world with no rules against the transgression was 
introduced to them. However, on the contrary, in our data, children’s ratings for these 
same kinds of transgressions did drop when they were told to imagine a world with no 
rules against the transgressions. This inconsistency highlights the importance of 
replicating classical work on moral development with diverse populations and across 
different social strata as well as cultures and countries. Moreover, diversity in 
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experimental design can be exceptionally informative as well. Most research 
investigating the extent to which children’s moral reasoning is sensitive to social rules 
has been done in a within-subject design, where children are first asked to rate a 
transgression, then introduced a world with no rules, and then asked to rate the same 
transgression again, now in the hypothetical no-rule world. An unwanted consequence of 
this design could be children’s belief that they “should” change their original answer 
when new information is introduced to them. Thus, to systematically study children’s 
understanding of interactions as regulated by moral principles or social norms, the 
original severity ratings and the ratings in a no-rule world should be measured in a 
between-subject design.  
 In addition to the indirect link between essentialism and moral reasoning 
suggested by the data, another interesting pattern emerges from different observations in 
Chapter 3, which suggest that children pick up on specific conventional norms regulating 
certain interactions (e.g. boys teasing girls) more readily than moral norms in intergroup 
contexts. More importantly, we observed that with age, children become even more 
responsive to context-specific norms, a process that perhaps facilitates their socialization. 
Specifically, in the category of Gender, children rated transgressions committed by a boy 
against a girl as being worse than those committed by a boy against another boy, when 
they were first shown the interactions. However, interestingly, this pattern did not hold 
any longer when children were asked to assume that there was no rule against the 
behavior. This suggests that children readily apply a learned conventional rule (i.e. boys 
should be nice to girls) in their judgments of interactions without any explicit instruction 
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to focus on rules; yet when explicitly told that rules do not apply, children make more 
lenient judgments about how bad it is for a boy to harm a girl. More broadly, these 
observations suggest two immediate conclusions: 1. Children, between the ages of 5 and 
10 years, do not generally apply internal, moral standards to all transgressions, and they 
judge most transgressions based on context-specific, social conventions (as was the case 
for children’s ratings in the category of Gender from Study 4, but also in all other 
categories where ratings dropped when rules were explicitly made ineffective. 2. 
Children’s sensitivity to context-specific conventions can overturn a group bias in 
making moral judgments, despite their essentialist bias (this was the case in children’s 
judgments of transgressions in the category of Gender; since Gender is the highest 
essentialized category, we expected children to judge between-group harm less severely, 
compared to within-group harm; however, the opposite pattern was observed, presumably 
because children’s moral judgments were more sensitive to the learned rule of “boys 
should be nice to girls”, than to the mechanisms at work in social essentialism). This 
receptivity to social, conventional norms can be very good news, despite suggesting that 
children do not internalize moral principles, because it implies that social, structural, and 
legal reforms can be effective by influencing the origins of individual attitudes and 
behaviors.    
 Lastly, a more speculative conclusion can be drawn about the link between 
children’s social essentialist bias and intergroup morality. Namely, perhaps the same 
rule-sensitivity that can moderate children’s out-group moral biases in cases where 
explicit rules against a bias are in place (as we believe was the case with how children 
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responded to transgressions in the Gender category), can also facilitate the role of social 
essentialism in intergroup morality. Specifically, our results motivate the idea that 
although the degree of essentialism of a specific social category depends on a biological 
representation of the category itself, and not on external, cultural and social realities, the 
link from social essentialism to intergroup morality does depend on social and cultural 
realities. In future work, we can further test this proposal by comparing results from 
children in Turkey, using an identical design to Study 4, for cross-cultural comparisons.  
In light of these patterns, future work should focus on the interplay between rule 
sensitivity and moral biases in inter-group contexts where salient group discrimination 
and conflict is in place. For example, if the prevalent social rule is, “report undocumented 
immigrants”, in a context where conflict, tension, and discrimination against 
undocumented immigrants is already existing, do children (1) hold exceptionally strong 
essentialist beliefs about undocumented immigrants, and (2) exhibit a group bias in their 
moral reasoning when judging transgressions against undocumented immigrants? 
Although the prevalence of essentialsit beliefs in intergroup contexts where group 
differences as especially salient has been studied (see Smyth et al., in press), the causal 
directionality between the two phenomena has not been investigated. Thus, a relevant and 
interesting question for future research is to ask about the directionality of a link between 
social essentialism and moral reasoning in children and adults. Specifically, it is possible 
that essentialization of social categories, which clearly do not have any biological 
underpinning (e.g. Sports-Team fans, religious affiliation, or novel, minimal groups 
created on the basis of shirt-color), can be induced simply by presenting biased attitude 
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and/or behavior towards different groups. For example, do children come to assume that 
people who affiliate with Islam are fundamentally, inherently, and unchangeably, 
different from people who affiliate with Christianity, if they are consistently exposed to 
differential treatment of and attitude towards these groups? This can be tested in an 
experimental paradigm where children are shown two characters from different minimal 
groups and then observe adults treating these characters differently over a few trials. 
Their essentialist views towards the groups can then be measured using standard 
measures of social essentialism.  
 We believe the questions we asked and investigated in this dissertation are of 
utmost importance given the state of our world today and should be explored with rigor 
and commitment across different fields. To offer a more hopeful note, however, we also 
emphasize the lack of findings on intergroup moral biases among children in most 
scenarios presented to them, including transgressions between the “rich” and the “poor” 
and those between a Red Sox fan and a Yankees fan.  Children were quite clear that 









A. SCRIPT (STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3) 
(Example given for Religion): 
 
(i) Birth: “Do you think B was born a Muslim and G was born a Christian?” 
(ii) Blood: “Do you think in the future scientists can tell that B is a Muslim and G a 
Christian by looking at the blood under a microscope?” 
(iii)  Brain: “Do you think that B’s brain is different from G’s brain?” 
(iv)  Change: “Do you think that G could become a Muslim and B could become a 
Christian one day if they wanted to?” 
(v) Environment: “Why is B a Muslim and G is a Christian? Do you think it’s 
because of things people around them do?” 
Controls: 
 “Do you think B has a lot of friends?” 












Study 1 – Means and standard errors of total essentialism scores by age group and each 








Study 2 – Means and standard errors of total essentialism scores by age group and social 











Study 3 – Means and standard errors of adults’ total essentialism scores by country.  
 5-6 Year Olds 7-8 Year Olds 9-10 Year Olds 
Gender 3.89 (0.29) 3.92 (0.20) 4.08 (0.14) 
Nationality 3.25 (0.27) 3.70 (0.21) 3.32 (0.19) 
Religion 3.36 (0.23) 3.00 (0.23) 2.90 (0.23) 
SES 3.06 (0.18) 2.52 (0.20) 2.66 (0.14) 
Teams 2.67 (0.20) 2.04 (0.20) 2.02 (0.15) 
 5-6 Year Olds 7-8 Year 
Olds 
9-10 Year Olds 
Gender 3.78 (0.16) 4.14 (0.14) 4.39 (0.17) 
Nationality 3.24 (0.18) 3.46 (0.16) 3.50 (0.24) 
Religion 3.04 (0.20) 3.40 (0.20) 2.89 (0.21) 
SES 2.98 (0.20) 2.58 (0.13) 2.00 (0.18) 
Teams 2.88 (0.18) 2.14 (0.17) 1.48 (0.17) 
 Adults (Turkey) Adults (U.S.) 
Gender 3.09 (0.08) 2.97 (0.09) 
Nationality 2.27 (0.10) 2.23 (0.10) 
Religion 0.95 (0.07) 1.06 (0.06) 
SES 1.48 (0.07) 1.41 (0.07) 
Teams 
 




C. SCRIPT (STUDY 4) 
 
Example given for Nationality 
(Order of events within a trial is marked by roman numerals; all events repeat for each 
trial, in the same order) 
Alphabet letters and specific story used for Within and Between are randomized.  
 
Stories (Trial 1 – 6) 
Stealing – Within 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This is N and this is D. D (or N – 
randomly assigned) is American and N is also American. 
N and D are playing together. N has a book that D really likes. But the book 
belongs to N. When N isn’t looking, D takes N’s book, and never gives it back. 
 
Stealing – Between 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This one is B and this one is G. B is 
American, but G is not American, G is British. 
B and G are drawing pictures together. G has a pen that B really likes. But the 






Physical Harm – Within 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This is K and this is L. K is American and 
L is also American.  
K and L are playing at the playground together. When they are running and 
racing each other, K puts out his leg and trips L, and L falls on the ground.  
 
Physical Harm – Between 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This is S and this is T. S is American, but 
T is not American, T is British.  
S and T are playing in the playground together. T is on the swing, and S does not 
wait for his/her turn and tries to push T off the swing.  
 
Teasing – Within 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This is E and this is C. E is American, and 
C is also American. 
E and C are playing in the park and having snacks. C is eating chocolate when E 
calls him/her “fat” and starts laughing.  
 
Teasing – Between 
I. Story - These are two kids your age. This is F and this is M. F is American, but 
M is not American, M is British.  
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F and M are doing homework together. When they are doing math homework, M 
makes a mistake and F calls him “stupid” and starts laughing.   
 
D. Procedure and Measures (for each story; example given for Stealing – Within) 
II.  Question 1 (Severity) 
Okay, remember D was American and N was also American.  
Now I want to ask you a question about what D did to N. Do you think that what 
D did to N was okay, or not okay? 
If child says, “not okay,” then ask, “was it just not okay, or bad, or very bad? 
[Please refer to three circles with different sizes].   
If child says, “okay”, then ask “was is just okay, or good, or very good?” [Refer 
to circles] 
III. Introduction to Smiley Face Scale (first trial only) 
Okay, now I want to ask you some questions about feelings. See these faces? We 
can use these faces to answer the questions about feelings. Let me tell you what 
these faces mean. This one is very happy – it’s the happiest. This one is happy, but 
not as happy as this one. This one is not feeling happy, but she/he is also not 
feeling sad. This one is a little sad, but not as sad as this one. This one is very sad 






IV. Testing Comprehension of Scale  
Now, can you show me the one that is very happy? What about the one that is not 
happy but also not sad? And which one is the saddest? Can you show me the one 
that is a little happy? And which one is a little sad? 
V. Presenting Smiley Face Scale 
Now, we’ll use the faces to answer two questions. But, first let me see if you 
remember who is who 
VI. Check memory of group membership: Remember N? Was N an American 
or a British? And what about D, was he/she an American or a British? [Remind 
child if forgotten] 
VII. Question 2 (Empathy)  
Remember what happened to N? How did that make you feel? Can you show me 
by pointing to one of the faces?  
Justification – Why did you feel that way? 
VIII. Question 3 (Mental State Understanding)   
How do you think N feels? Can you show me by pointing to one of the faces? 
IX. Rule Information 
Now, imagine D and N live in a place where there are no rules about taking each 
other’s things and never retuning them. Let’s pretend that in the place they live in, 
the grownups said that the kids could take each other’s things and not return 
them. I know it may sound a little strange, but let’s just imagine that. Let’s 
pretend that such a place actually exists.  
	  	  
115 
X. Question 4 (after-Rule) 
Then would it be okay or not okay for D to take N’s book and never return it?  
If child says, “not okay”, then ask, “would it then be just not okay, or bad, or 
very bad?” 
If child says, “okay”, then ask, “would it then be just okay, or good, or very 
good?” 
 
Essentialism Questions (Last Trial) 
This is P and this is Z. P is British and Z is American. 
Born – Do you think that P was born British and Z was born American?   
Brain – Do you think that P’s brain is different from Z’s brain? 
Blood – Do you think that in the future, scientists can figure out that P is British and Z is 
American by looking at their blood under a microscope?  
Change – Do you think that P can become American and Z can become British one day if 
they want to?  
Environment – Why is Z American and P British? Do you think because of things that 
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